



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**BEYOND HATE: COUNTERING VIOLENT  
EXTREMISM FROM THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT**

by

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September 2013

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**BEYOND HATE: COUNTERING VIOLENT  
EXTREMISM FROM THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABT	Aryan Brotherhood of Texas
AC	Aryan Circle
ADL	Anti-Defamation League
CSA	The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord
DFW	Dallas/Ft. Worth
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HRT	Hostage Rescue Team
IP	Internet Protocol
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISP	Internet Service Providers
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
MINAB	Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board
NGO	Nongovernment Organization
PET	Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
RAHOWA	Racial Holy War
RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
RII	Referent Informational Influence
ROC Centers	Regional Outreach Coordination Centers
SIT	SIT
SPLC	Southern Poverty Law Center
TERRA	Terrorism and Radicalisation
UK	United Kingdom
ZOG	Zionist Occupied Government

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. In fact, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano previously stated that countering violent extremism was a DHS priority.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism, specifically violent extremism from within the Texas based klaverns of the Ku Klux Klan. This research includes a background history of the Klan, including events specifically in Texas.

The research also considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), including efforts to counter the Salafi-jihadist narrative and gang intervention techniques. While these methods were not for the white supremacist movement, they may apply to the right wing in efforts to counter violent extremism. In addition to reviewing the successes, and considering the failures, of other methods, the research uses primary source case study comparisons. Significantly, limited research is available that uses primary sources. The individuals who participated were actively involved with planned domestic terror plots within the United States, when they formerly held leadership positions within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA).

The results of the research were surprising in that they revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different ideological groups. In addition, the research revealed the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan. The motivation to join and continue participation is explained using Social Identity Theory (SIT), which is the theoretical framework for the research. Although not a new concept, SIT is applied largely to Islamist organizations in an

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<sup>1</sup> Brian Seals, "CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the White House," *Watermark*, Spring 2012, 2.

effort to counter violent extremism. Interestingly, the same framework works well in application to the right-wing movement also. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers. Much more research is needed in the arena of countering white power violent extremism, but this research provides a starting point for those who follow.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. PROBLEM SPACE–BACKGROUND

When asked about the presence of white supremacist organizations, the response of some law enforcement leaders is, “We don’t have that problem here.” It can only be assumed a level of denial is apparent that any “problem” exists. Since many deny the “problem” exists, a lack of concern and a negative attitude toward attempts to counter violent extremism from white supremacist organizations also exists. At a White House conference, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano stated countering violent extremism was a DHS priority.<sup>1</sup> The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and similar organizations certainly qualify as organizations likely to spawn violent extremism.

Documented attempts of KKK members planning or performing acts of violence are available. Two examples of the very real threat posed by the KKK include a conspiracy to bomb a Wise County, Texas, natural gas processing plant owned by Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation, and the dragging death of James Byrd Jr. in Jasper, Texas.<sup>2</sup> Since the KKK is alive and well in the United States, it is necessary to understand their ideology and motivations, and determine methods to mitigate extremist violence posed by far right members within the organization.

Individuals within the KKK are drawn together by a common bond of belief in God and racial purity.<sup>3</sup> An effective approach to countering extremism within

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<sup>1</sup> Brian Seals, “CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the White House,” *Watermark*, 2012, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Sam Verhovek, “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot,” *New York Times*, April 25, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/25/us/us-officials-link-klan-faction-to-1-of-4-people-held-in-texas-bomb-plot.html>; David Carson, “Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer,” *TX Executions*, September 23, 2011, <http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/475.asp>.

<sup>3</sup> “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel, released September 27, 2005 (New York, NY: NY: A & E Home Video, 2005), DVD; “Klan of Killers,” *Gangland*, season 5, episode 2, produced by Elizabeth Tyson, aired June 4, 2009 (New York, NY: A & E Home Video, 2009), DVD.

the KKK must acknowledge the differences in beliefs held by the membership and the overall community, yet include an agreement to suspend judgment. According to Chip Berlet, radical change in conversation is a step toward establishing a relationship.<sup>4</sup> This method of “disarming” the movement previously proved successful with the Posse Comitatus.<sup>5</sup> Extremism will never be abolished, but it is necessary to counter extremist violence and if history is capable of repeating itself, building a relationship with KKK members is a step toward countering violent extremism from within the movement.

This research compares two separate cases involving former white supremacist leaders who prevented, or aborted, acts of domestic terrorism from their organizations. The research details the events involving each leader, along with insights into the organizations, and the overall white supremacist culture. Interviews with the specific leaders of a Texas KKK group and an Arkansas Christian Identity group serve as the basis of this research. The primary goal of the interviews was to determine if general knowledge of a specific group's ideologies provides enough information for law enforcement and counterterrorism leaders going forward to establish a process of countering violent extremism, specifically from within the KKK in Texas.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This research addresses five important questions related to white extremist issues.

- Is it possible to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?
- Are there generational differences in leadership that effect interactions with the group?
- Does religion influence race relations?
- What induces participation in the group?
- Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?

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<sup>4</sup> Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, “Militia Nation,” *The Progressive* 59 (June 1995): 25.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

## C. HYPOTHESES

The expected results of the research questions include the following.

- It is possible to counter KKK violent extremism. The Posse Comitatus, also a right-wing group, declined following a successful intervention.<sup>6</sup> In addition, other countries have successfully combated domestic terrorism, so it is possible to counter Klan violence as well.<sup>7</sup>
- Generational differences in leaders and members affect the chance of interacting with right-wing groups for counterterrorism efforts. Older members are more likely to have “traditional” American values and are, therefore, more likely to assist law enforcement in the prevention of violence aimed at innocents in the furtherance of their ideology.
- Based on their history as protector of the white Protestant America, the KKK potentially has strong religious beliefs.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, it is likely that religion influences race relations in the KKK, considered by most to be a racially motivated hate group.
- The desire to participate in the KKK is best explained through the lens of SIT. Individuals naturally feel a desire to belong to a group that provides them with a positive self-image. Those in search of this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to join a group that will fulfill their emotional needs.<sup>9</sup> The group will be of like-minded individuals, who bolster the individual, and increase the positive feelings associated with their identity.
- “Balanced-power” is a feasible approach to countering KKK violent extremism. Drawing on successes and failures in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Brad Deardorff suggests implementing Regional Outreach Coordination Centers (ROC Centers) to oversee local counterterrorism efforts.<sup>10</sup> The ROC

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<sup>6</sup> Berlet and Lyons, “Militia Nation,” 25.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 35–38.

<sup>8</sup> David Mark Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 33.

<sup>9</sup> Fathali M Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 94–95; Michael A Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social identifications a social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes* (London; New York: Routledge, 1988).

<sup>10</sup> R. Brad Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism* (Agile Press, 2013), 223.

Center, although intended to focus on countering the Salafi-jihadi narrative, has the potential to be applicable to many different types of organizations, including white supremacists.<sup>11</sup>

#### **D. SIGNIFICANCE**

The significance of the research is the exploration of SIT in the context of practitioner application. Extensive research and literature is available on counterterrorism efforts aimed at Islamist organizations. Also available is extensive literature on the right-wing movement as a whole, but little on counterterrorism efforts involving white supremacist groups. Additionally, most research on white supremacist groups is presented in a potentially biased manner.

This research stands to add to the body of work, terrorism studies. It appears in an unbiased, academic manner, and includes efforts to present a fair and accurate representation of the individual cases and the people involved. It also provides primary source research aimed at domestic counterterrorism in an environment fueled by concerns of international terrorism, and based largely on secondary source research. The research sits against the backdrop of the practical experience of the researcher, which stems from 16 years in law enforcement.

Lastly, the research serves to remind society that domestic violent extremism, fueled by racially motivated hatred, still exists in the country. The idea of discussing race needs to be confronted and accepted for what it is, a constitutionally protected right of free speech. While individuals may not agree with expressions of hate, society needs to look racism in the face, accept the ugly truth of prejudice, and find the courage to go beyond hate to confront white power violent extremism.

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<sup>11</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 186, 189.

## II. BACKGROUND

When considering white supremacist organizations in the Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) area, one must first take into account the Aryan Circle (AC) and the Aryan Brotherhood of Texas (ABT), whose members largely reside in the southeastern portion of the City of Dallas and its neighboring suburbs.<sup>12</sup> Both the AC and ABT are classified as criminal gangs rather than white supremacist groups.<sup>13</sup> This classification is due their likelihood to do business with people regardless of race or ethnicity, and that some members have Hispanic girlfriends.<sup>14</sup> Hispanic ethnicity falls within the Caucasian race, but many groups see them as separate and not true Aryans. However, according to a former leader within the KKK, the groups collaborate and work together.<sup>15</sup> The question begs then, why is “Aryan” part of these groups’ self-identified label? Looking at this phenomenon through the lens of SIT, it is evidence of what Henri Tajfel, in his work *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, explains as the process related to stereotyping, where the in-group perceives an intragroup, or within the group, similarity that enhances the members’ positive self-identity.<sup>16</sup> Tajfel refers to the process of stereotyping as Referent Informational Influence (RII), which happens in three phases.<sup>17</sup> The first phase involves the individual self-identifying as a member of a specific category,

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<sup>12</sup> ADL, “The Aryan Brotherhood of Texas,” April 4, 2013, <http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/domestic-extremism-terrorism/c/aryan-brotherhood-texas-report.html>; *The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate* (New York, NY: Anti-Defamation League, October 2009), 11; “Circle of Death,” Gangland, season 5, episode 8, aired July 16, 2009 (New York, NY: A & E Home Video, 2009), DVD; “Aryan Terror,” Gangland, season 4, episode 7, aired March 26, 2009 (New York, NY: A & E Home Video, 2009), DVD; personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment.

<sup>13</sup> *National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends* (Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011), 31, 44, 76; *The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate*, 7, 22, 28; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment.

<sup>14</sup> “Aryan Terror,” Gangland; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment.

<sup>15</sup> Robert Spence, in interview with the author, September 5, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, reissue (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 29–30.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

in this case, the Aryan race.<sup>18</sup> Next, the individuals learn and apply specific desirable behaviors to their self-identified category.<sup>19</sup> Last, the individual assigns norms to themselves, related to their self-identified category, which become stereotypical normal behavior related to positive membership within the in-group.<sup>20</sup> Thus, anyone whose behavior or characteristics fall outside the norm of the in-group necessarily becomes a stereotypical member of the out-group, or the “other.”<sup>21</sup>

According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), within the AC, racial solidarity is also useful in binding the membership together in a familial relationship.<sup>22</sup> The racial solidarity relates to membership in the Aryan race and does not include those of Hispanic ethnicity, which is evidence of the in-group comparing themselves to the “other,” or out-group, to validate and cement their positive self-identity associated with membership within their organization.<sup>23</sup> According to Tajfel, the group “aims to differentiate itself from others in order to achieve or maintain superiority on some existing and situationally relevant dimension of comparison.”<sup>24</sup> In this instance, some AC and ABT members do not consider Hispanics members of the white race to elevate themselves above the out-group, and increase their self-worth related to membership within the in-group, or their chosen personal group.

Since much of law enforcement and many community leaders deny the “problem” exists, a lack of concern and a negative attitude occurs toward attempts to counter violent extremism from white supremacist organizations. At a White House conference, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano stated countering

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<sup>18</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 31.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 28–33.

<sup>22</sup> *The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate*, 4, 24.

<sup>23</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 156.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

violent extremism was a DHS priority.<sup>25</sup> The KKK and similar organizations certainly qualify as organizations likely to spawn violent extremism.<sup>26</sup> Documented attempts of KKK members planning or performing acts of violence are available.<sup>27</sup> Two examples of the very real threat posed by the KKK include a conspiracy to bomb a Wise County, Texas, natural gas processing plant owned by Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation, and the dragging death of James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Texas.<sup>28</sup> During April 1997, following an investigation, the FBI arrested a group of four KKK members for conspiracy to bomb a natural gas plant, which was meant to divert attention from a planned armored car robbery, the proceeds of which were to start a racial holy war.<sup>29</sup> This incident, dubbed “Operation Sour Gas” by the FBI, is covered in detail in this research. In addition, in June 1998, Lawrence Brewer, who had ties to a KKK affiliated prison gang, along with two other men, dragged James Byrd, Jr. to his death in Jasper,

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<sup>25</sup> Seals, “CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the White House,” 2.

<sup>26</sup> Spence, interview; Kerry Noble, in interview with the author, August 14, 2013.

<sup>27</sup> Christine Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns: Texas Monthly,” *Texas Monthly*, January 1998, <http://www.texasmonthly.com/1998-01-01/crime.php>; Andrew Blejwas, Anthony Griggs, and Mark Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing,” *Southern Poverty Law Center*, Summer 2005, <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2005/summer/terror-from-the-right-0?page=0,3>; David Carson, “Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer,” *TX Executions*, September 23, 2011, <http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/475.asp>; Agence France-Presse, “Ku Klux Klan Member Executed over 1998 Texas Murder,” *The Raw Story*, September 21, 2011, <http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/09/21/ku-klux-klan-member-executed-over-1998-texas-murder/>; Mike Malloy, “April (Gun) Showers,” *Huff Post Politics*, March 30, 2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-malloy/april-gun-showers\\_b\\_519274.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-malloy/april-gun-showers_b_519274.html); Verhovek, “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot”; Terry Wallace, “Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas Processing Plant,” *Texas News*, April 25, 1997, <http://www.texnews.com/texas97/terror042597.html>; *State of Texas V. Lawrence Russell Brewer* (District 1A, Jasper County, Texas 1999); *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5,” December 16, 2010, [http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/december/klan\\_121610](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/december/klan_121610); Southern Poverty Law Center, “Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City,” (n.d.), <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/terror-from-the-right>.

<sup>28</sup> Verhovek, “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot”; Carson, “Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer.”

<sup>29</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5.”

Texas.<sup>30</sup> Brewer was convicted of capital murder on September 20, 1999, in Jasper County District Court 1-A, Docket #8870, and later executed on September 21, 2011.<sup>31</sup>

Right wing groups are not responsible for as many deaths in the United States as radical Islamists, but the threat is no less real.<sup>32</sup> The actions of Wade Michael Page at the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin on August 5, 2012, are evidence of the ongoing danger posed by extremist violence tied to members of white supremacist groups.<sup>33</sup> The possibility of violent extremism within the KKK has not disappeared, but is operating underground. The clandestine nature of the groups is common knowledge for authorities and advocated by leaders within the movement.<sup>34</sup> Society must accept a presence of white supremacist organizations are in existence in the North Texas area and make a concerted effort to counter violent extremism from within their ranks.

This research focuses on countering violent extremism from factions of the KKK in the North Texas area. It is, therefore, necessary to begin by presenting a brief history of the KKK in the United States and Texas to provide the reader a basic understanding of the historical facts of the organization, ideology, motivations of the membership, and understanding of why the organization has

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<sup>30</sup> Doug Miller, "James Byrd's Killer: 'I'd Do It All over Again'," *Kens5.com San Antonio*, September 21, 2011, <http://www.kens5.com/news/130314468.html>; Greg Abbott, "Attorney General of Texas, (n.d.), <https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagNews/release.php?id=3852>; Carson, "Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer."

<sup>31</sup> Miller, "James Byrd's Killer: 'I'd Do It All over Again'"; Carson, "Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer"; "Texas Attorney General"; *State of Texas V. Lawrence Russell Brewer* (District 1A, Jasper County, Texas 1999).

<sup>32</sup> Johnston's Archives, "Terrorist Attacks and Related Incidents in the United States," May 18, 2013, <http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html>.

<sup>33</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Oak Creek Sikh Temple Shooting Investigation Conclusion," November 20, 2012, <http://www.fbi.gov/milwaukee/press-releases/2012/oak-creek-sikh-temple-shooting-investigation-conclusion>; John Diedrich, "FBI Warrant Details Sikh Temple Shooter's Online White Power Searches," *JSOnline*, May 13, 2013, <http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/fbi-warrant-details-sikh-temple-shooters-online-white-power-searches-jr9udd1-207291121.html>.

<sup>34</sup> Louis R. Beam Jr., "Leaderless Resistance," Issue 12, Final Edition, *The Seditonist*, February 1992, <http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm>; "Klan of Killers," Gangland; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment.



persisted over the decades. While theology plays a part in the CSA case study, a history of Christian Identity theology is not necessary for this thesis.<sup>35</sup> Minor background information is available in the CSA case study to inform the reader. However, since the focus of this research is on the KKK specifically, whose ideology includes theological portions related to out-group categorizations rather than theological motivations, that information is not included in the background chapter.<sup>36</sup>

The KKK is considered the oldest domestic terrorist organization in the United States and was established in December 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee.<sup>37</sup> The six founders were former Confederate soldiers, college educated, and looking for fraternal social enjoyment.<sup>38</sup> While no violent intentions occurred initially, this situation changed as the organization morphed over the years. During Reconstruction, society perceived the KKK as the enforcers of Southern American values.<sup>39</sup> At this time in history, the Southern whites felt disenfranchised by what they saw as radical government actions during the period of Reconstruction and they felt threatened by the thought of a black insurrection, especially since blacks formed the majority of the population.<sup>40</sup> As violence increased, Imperial Wizard Nathan Bedford Forrest, former Confederate General, formally disbanded the KKK in January 1869.<sup>41</sup> Most Klan groups complied, but others continued until mass arrests resulted in compliance of the

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<sup>35</sup> David W. Brannan, "The Evolution of the Church of Israel: Dangerous Mutations," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 3 (1999): 106–118, doi:10.1080/09546559908427519; David Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity" (St. Andrew's University, Scotland, 2006).

<sup>36</sup> David Brannan and Anders Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners* (Monterey, CA: Unpublished Draft Copy, 2012), 27.

<sup>37</sup> "The Ku Klux Klan," Directed by Bill Brummel; Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 8.

<sup>38</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 8–9.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 13; D. L. (Daniel Love) Wilson, J. C. Lester, and Walter Lynwood Fleming, *Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment*, n.d., Kindle edition, loc 109 of 2871.

<sup>40</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 16–17.

<sup>41</sup> Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, *Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment*, Kindle edition, loc 153 of 2871; Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 19.

continuing groups in 1872.<sup>42</sup> By this time, the organization began its return to an acceptable societal norm, where occasional violence occurred, “but it was not masked and did not ride at night.”<sup>43</sup>

It is important to understand the motivations for these Klan founders, and why society accepted their presence, and even encouraged, their interventions. For the white Southerner, the KKK was perceived to be the protector of general Southern honor and values, which included their views on the role of white women (viewed as a repository of societal honor), and often viewed as representing the heart of their Southern culture.<sup>44</sup> The Klan perceived Reconstruction era activities as a challenge to this Southern honor, which as a social capital is a limited good.<sup>45</sup> In response to the challenge, the Klan is obligated to respond, to “protect” this honor of their perceived in-group, white America.<sup>46</sup> According to Annie Burton in 1916, “...the grand old Order had accomplished what it set out to do. Its work was nobly done; and our rescued South still sings her gratitude to her heaven-sent protectors, the mysterious K.K.K.”<sup>47</sup> The Klan was in a patron-client relationship with white America, where they served as protector, or patron, to the people of the South, their clients, who in turn honored them as the only power who could have saved them during that

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<sup>42</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 19; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence* (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011), 15.

<sup>43</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 19; Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, *Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment*, loc 152 of 2871; Annie Cooper Burton, *The Ku Klux Klan* (Los Angeles, California: Warren T. Potter, 1916), Kindle edition, loc 9 of 338; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 15.

<sup>44</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 21.

<sup>45</sup> David W. Brannan and Anders Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security” (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 8, 2012); Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 37–38.

<sup>46</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 38.

<sup>47</sup> Burton, *The Ku Klux Klan*, loc 74 of 338.

time.<sup>48</sup> The notion of the KKK “as the savior of an oppressed people during the dark days of Reconstruction” would hold fast for future generations and become “the treasured folk heritage.”<sup>49</sup>

D. W. Griffith’s film, *The Birth of a Nation*, which glorified the Klan, was a phenomenal success.<sup>50</sup> To those Southerners who embraced the KKK as the protector who returned order to the South, the film glorified the Klan, and strengthened the in-group narrative, including the positive identity the members received based on their Klan association.<sup>51</sup> The film solidified the Klan’s position in society, and therefore, their in-group status; and the spotlight Griffith placed on the KKK also offered them a chance to be reborn, an opportunity that William J. Simmons seized.<sup>52</sup> In addition, the racially motivated themes in the film further subjected blacks to the minority out-group status they already held, only more so.<sup>53</sup> Griffith’s film and Simmons’ leadership facilitated the growth of a new Klan era of increased memberships and political power across the country. As with the original intent of the founding members, the KKK was not a right-wing terrorist group, but rather a fraternal organization that embraced the ideal of the American white Protestant as supreme.<sup>54</sup> Important to consider is the emphasis on the idea of fraternity, which “had long since come to mean the exclusiveness of the in-group, rather than the commonality and brotherhood of mankind.”<sup>55</sup> According to David M. Chalmers, “Probably the greatest strength of the Invisible Empire lay

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<sup>48</sup> Burton, *The Ku Klux Klan*, loc 9 of 338; Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 40.

<sup>49</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 23.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 25–28; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 21; Burton, *The Ku Klux Klan*, loc 9 of 338.

<sup>51</sup> Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, *Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment*, Kindle edition, loc 109 of 2871; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 21; Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 95, 97.

<sup>52</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 25–28.

<sup>53</sup> *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 21; Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 98.

<sup>54</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 30.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 31; Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, *Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment*, loc 109 of 2871.

not in its creed, but in its excitement and in-group fraternalism.”<sup>56</sup> Chalmers, perhaps unknowingly, introduces SIT as a theoretical framework to explain Klan membership.<sup>57</sup> The importance of in-group dynamics is the group provides members with a positive self-identity.<sup>58</sup>

During the 1920s, the Klan found their focus on anti-Catholicism, which attributed to the success of the KKK during the high point in its history.<sup>59</sup> As opposed to a focus on theology, the focus was on opposing that which is different and therefore cannot assimilate into American society.<sup>60</sup> The KKK viewed the Catholics as such, whom they believed were subjugated to Papal rule, and therefore, anti-American.<sup>61</sup> Again, the KKK emerges as protector, as white Protestant America sees itself as under attack.<sup>62</sup> The actions of the Klan in response to Catholicism and fears of Papal rule typify the SIT analytical markers, honor-shame, and challenge-response.<sup>63</sup> First, without honor, a group is useless so it must act to avoid the shame of failure to protect white Protestant America.<sup>64</sup> Honor is social capital, which serves as a commodity to trade between the Klan, in-group, and the “other,” out-groups.<sup>65</sup> In trading the commodity of honor, the Klan makes negative honor challenges toward the out-group, while also making

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<sup>56</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 13.

<sup>57</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 27.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 33; Ezra Asher Cook, *Ku Klux Klan Secrets Exposed Attitude toward Jews, Catholics, Foreigners and Masons. Fraudulent Methods Used. Atrocities Committed in Name of Order* (Chicago, IL, 1922), Kindle edition, loc 250 of 881, 535 to 648 of 881.

<sup>60</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 110–111; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 15.

<sup>61</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 110–111.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 112–113.

<sup>63</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 37–38.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.; Brannan and Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security.”

<sup>65</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 37–39.

positive honor challenges within the in-group.<sup>66</sup> This challenge serves to increase the positive identity associated with positions held within the in-group, in addition to further elevating the status of the in-group above that of the out-group; hereby, further increasing the positive association of membership in the Klan for the in-group members.<sup>67</sup>

Second, a particular group faces an initial challenge, which it must perceive as such, which elicits a requirement to respond for the purpose of defense and evaluation by society.<sup>68</sup> Should the group see an action as a negative honor challenge, it is obliged to respond. Response allows the group to avoid the loss of honor, or any transaction capital it defends.<sup>69</sup> Despite its power during that time, the violent tactics embraced by the Klan eventually led to its downfall as the press publicly displayed its weaknesses and failures.<sup>70</sup> In the end, "Terror went too far; the extremists ranted too loudly and the leaders were too immoral and uninspiringly inept."<sup>71</sup>

The State of Texas had crucial ties to the KKK during this time and was the first location issued a charter and listed as an independent governing faction of what came to be the Invisible Empire.<sup>72</sup> The KKK saw success in local elections in Texas, as well as the election of Earl B. Mayfield, the first member of the KKK elected to hold office in the United States Senate.<sup>73</sup> In addition, Dallas, Texas dentist Hiram Wesley Evans would later rise to power as the Imperial Wizard of the Invisible Empire when he wrested control of the entire organization

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<sup>66</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 37–38.

<sup>67</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 94–98.

<sup>68</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 38.

<sup>69</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, "The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security"; Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*.

<sup>70</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 295–297.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 299.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 22.

from William Simmons in late 1922.<sup>74</sup> At the height of power, the KKK boasted between two and three million members during the mid-1920s.<sup>75</sup>

In October 1946, Dr. Samuel Green once again revived the organization with the tried and true purpose of protecting, home, hearth, the virtue of the white woman, and Americanism.<sup>76</sup> The rebirth met with little success as society was unwilling to tolerate the violence of a terrorist organization within their midst.<sup>77</sup> Henry P. Fry, former Klansman stated in his work, *The Modern Ku Klux Klan*, “There is no place in America for an ‘Invisible Empire’ of hate and venom; and there is no provision in the laws of this country for an ‘Emperor!’”<sup>78</sup> Upon the death of Green in August 1949, the organization broke apart and individual factions of the KKK became the new norm.<sup>79</sup> For instance, the following Klans all exist in Texas alone: American White Knights of the KKK, Bayou Knights of the KKK, Traditional Christian Knights of the KKK, White Camelia Knights of the KKK, United White Knights of the KKK, United Klans of America, Southern Kalvary Knights of the KKK, Loyal White Knights of the KKK, Lone Wolf Brigade Knights - Knights of the KKK, Empire Knights of the KKK, and United White Knights of the KKK.<sup>80</sup> Other areas throughout the United States have multiple manifestations of the Klan as well, all of which differ based on the individual

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<sup>74</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 100–108; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 20.

<sup>75</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 291; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 22.

<sup>76</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 325–326.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 334.

<sup>78</sup> Henry Peck Fry, *The Modern Ku Klux Klan* (Cambridge, MA: Small, Maynard & Company, 1922), Kindle edition, loc 30 of 259.

<sup>79</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 334–342; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 23.

<sup>80</sup> *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*, 17; Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Map,” (n.d.), <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map#s=ME>.

Klaverns.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, with multiple different groups spread around the nation, the idea of a single Klan ideal or unity is a myth, and not accurate at the group level.

It was not until May 17, 1954, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on *Brown v. Board of Education*, and brought about the new era of desegregation, that the KKK arose with a new purpose, and following.<sup>82</sup> Once again white America felt threatened, and once again, the KKK reemerged as “protector” and enforcer of white American values and Klan ideological honor. The KKK’s priority was no longer the protection of white Americans from the threat of Papal rule, as the rise of the black American and the prospects of integration presented a much greater threat in their minds.<sup>83</sup> According to Amy Gutmann in her work, *Identity in Democracy*, the Klan could “...credibly claim to represent a subordinated group: nonaffluent white Southern men who feel themselves to be increasingly marginalized in society...”<sup>84</sup> Once again, the patron Klan rises to protect its client, white America, in this challenge to their honor, or personal status in society, so as to avoid the shame of failure to act.<sup>85</sup> This period also brought with it a greater amount of violence from the KKK. With integration and the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s, not only did the violence increase, but so did the membership rosters of the KKK. The organization reportedly swelled its ranks by five to 10 thousand members, although greatly reduced from the numbers during the height of the Invisible Empire.<sup>86</sup> By the end of the 1960s, the larger American

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<sup>81</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Map”; *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*, 14–17.

<sup>82</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 343; National Park Service, “Brown v. Board of Education,” (n.d.), <http://www.nps.gov/bvrb/historyculture/upload/brown%20US%20supreme%20court.pdf>.

<sup>83</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 377.

<sup>84</sup> Amy Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), 228.

<sup>85</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 37–40.

<sup>86</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 384; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 25–27.

society accepted the racial changes and their savior, the KKK, was no longer necessary as people grew tired of the violence and the organization due to the focus of law enforcement and Congress.<sup>87</sup>

At the end of the 1970s, the Klan again saw a resurgence and, while not comparing in numbers to previous periods, a growth occurred within the ranks of the organization.<sup>88</sup> The resurgence was in response to economic anxiety and the inability of the Southerner to accept racial change.<sup>89</sup> The middle class worker perceived that the advancement of the black man resulted in a reversal for the white man.<sup>90</sup> From a theoretical framework, this perception is evidence of the group function within the SIT analytical framework and the importance of identifying cultural markers, like group honor as a perceived limited good within the honor challenge cycle.<sup>91</sup> To clarify, any social capital is in limited quantity, and in this case, that capital is the limited good of Southern white honor. The dwindling capital of Southern white honor is visible in the KKK's treatment during protests, versus the treatment received by individuals protesting during the Civil Rights movement.<sup>92</sup> For example, in August 1979, authorities arrested Imperial Wizard Bill Wilkinson's members for operating without a permit during a protest march, while they saw the followers of Martin Luther King, Jr. rally on the steps of the Alabama capital.<sup>93</sup> Seeing these followers only served to reinforce their fears about the results of racial equality and changes in the law and social order.

In the early 1980s, David Duke was recognized for his efforts to recruit young, educated individuals, and change the image of the KKK from an

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<sup>87</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 386, 396; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 27; ADL, "Ku Klux Klan—History," (n.d.), [http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext\\_us/kkk/history.asp?xpicked=4&item=kkk](http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/kkk/history.asp?xpicked=4&item=kkk).

<sup>88</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 406; "Ku Klux Klan—Extremism in America."

<sup>89</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 406–407.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 410; Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy*, 228.

<sup>91</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*; Brannan and Strindberg, "The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security."

<sup>92</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 410.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.



uneducated blue-collar worker to that of a sophisticated individual interested in the advancement of the white race rather than the oppression of others.<sup>94</sup> Duke, young, articulate, and well dressed, improved the public image of the Klan for a time, and was even allowed to run for political office.<sup>95</sup> These efforts were not sustainable within the movement, in part because the larger American society no longer widely accepted what many now consider acts of terrorism, rather than defensive acts, to protect in-group ideals and identity.

Throughout its history, the KKK has seen multiple declines and resurgences.<sup>96</sup> Currently, the estimated membership of KKK groups is approximately 5,000 across the United States, but others feel those numbers are much higher.<sup>97</sup> In addition to their base ideologies and motivations, individuals within the KKK come together through a common bond of belief in God and racial purity.<sup>98</sup> Further, basic human needs of inclusion permeate the groups, as members join for a sense of belonging and ritual, an individual freedom allowing people to express their individual identities within the setting of the group association.<sup>99</sup>

From 2000 to 2008, the United States saw a 54% increase in hate group membership throughout the country.<sup>100</sup> Others say the membership has dwindled so much, and become so fractured that the KKK is no longer a threat.<sup>101</sup> The group has reinvented itself numerous times since its formation,

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<sup>94</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 412–414; “Ku Klux Klan—Extremism in America”; *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 35.

<sup>95</sup> *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 35; “Ku Klux Klan—Extremism in America.”

<sup>96</sup> A&E Television Networks, *The Ku Klux Klan—A Secret History*; *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*, 1–2; Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*.

<sup>97</sup> *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*, 2; Spence, interview.

<sup>98</sup> “Klan of Killers,” Gangland; Spence, interview.

<sup>99</sup> “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel; Spence, interview; Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 157; Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 100; Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy*, 86, 90; Spence, interview; Noble, interview.

<sup>100</sup> “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

however, and ignoring this reinvention is a mistake because history shows it is strongest when able to capitalize on the fears of white America.<sup>102</sup> “History suggests the Klan will not disappear. They have died many deaths, only to be reborn when white America felt threatened.”<sup>103</sup>

It is important to consider the idea of the fraternity of the organization is to understand the ability to cross over into the accepted use of violence. According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, the psychology of an individual produces that person’s reality.<sup>104</sup> “Beyond this, however, the reality of everyday life is ongoingly affirmed in the individual’s interaction with others.”<sup>105</sup> Berger and Luckmann further explain the result of this interaction is the institutionalization of the social construction of the group’s reality.<sup>106</sup> In essence, like-minded individuals, with strong beliefs, form the basis of the KKK. These individuals each bring their own ideals into the organization, which meld together into the collective reality of the group. With the collective reality of a group, groupthink is more likely, which leads to terrorist acts of “self defense” being considered justifiable. The belief by the collective is, in response to the threat of Reconstruction, Catholicism, integration, immigration, etc., it is acceptable, even expected, to use “self defense.”

As the individual members of the KKK pledged devotion to the group, the other members become a reflection of the individual who sees “his fellow Klansmen...in the mirror of his own self-respect, to succeed, by whatever means.”<sup>107</sup> “Having thus emotionally crossed over the threshold of violence, the Klansman was highly likely to turn to action.”<sup>108</sup> In addition to the individual

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<sup>102</sup> *Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence*, 27.

<sup>103</sup> “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel.

<sup>104</sup> Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Anchor, 1967), 178.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>107</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 376.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

transformation, consider also the acceptance of violence, in certain circumstances, by society. According to Edgar Z. Friedenberg, society accepts a certain level of violence directed at protection against potential disruption.<sup>109</sup> This justification also allows the KKK to commit violence, condoned by not only the in-group but society as well, and thus, further cementing the heritage of the KKK as protector and patron to those with similar ideological or social frames.

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<sup>109</sup> Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "A Violent Country," *The New York Review of Books*, October 20, 1966, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1966/oct/20/a-violent-country/>, 3.

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### **III. LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The literature on white supremacy takes many different forms. While no one particular category stands out, studies and information are available across a wide variety of disciplines. The literature can be divided into six specific groups, some of which encompass multiple types of literature from varied sources, including law enforcement agencies and watchdog groups. The categories addressed are as follows: psychology and SIT, ideology, religion, technology, recruitment, and counter radicalization.

#### **B. REVIEW OF AVAILABLE LITERATURE**

##### **1. History**

The seminal work on the history of the KKK is David M. Chalmers' *Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan*. Chalmers provides a detailed insight into the KKK, along with facts about the numerous rises to power and subsequent declines from their formation in 1865 through the late 1970s. In addition to the information related to formation, power struggles, and the concerns of society during each period, Chalmers addresses the ideologies and motivations for KKK leaders and members. While Chalmers does not specifically name SIT as his theoretical frame for understanding Klan motivations, his specific accounts of basic motivations mirror the foundations of the theory used for this research.

While Chalmers aptly details motivations for members as in-group fraternalism and protectors of white American Protestant society, he also offers contradictions in at least one case.<sup>110</sup> Chalmers aptly explains throughout the work how the KKK protects and defends societal beliefs, especially those of the

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<sup>110</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 31, 110–112, 395.

white woman found at the heart of Southern culture.<sup>111</sup> He also explains in detail the process of an individual coming to accept violence as an approved form of defensive action in “protection” of the American ideals as understood by the in-group.<sup>112</sup> In addition, Chalmers, while again not naming it as such, presents the cultural markers necessary for an individual to use violence as an approved method.<sup>113</sup> While extensively explaining the group dynamics involved with the organization, Chalmers shows subtle nuances when he closes the work with an explanation that the organization “is an expression of—and often a solution to—its members’ own problems of personal and social definition.”<sup>114</sup> This explanation may be an indicator of an individual’s motivation for joining the KKK. However, this statement differs with the explanations Chalmers provides throughout the work that are in line with the group dynamics explained through the SIT framework.

The major concern with Chalmers’ work comes into play with the third edition. The second edition was released in 1968 and the third in 1981. The updated edition includes facts and Chalmers’ analysis for the period of the 1970s and early 1980s. Apparently, during that time, Chalmers experienced changes in his personal views. His later “analysis” appears to be personal attacks on individuals from the Southern portion of the United States rather than objective scholarship. Chalmers repeatedly refers to “poor-boy politics,” the “rural-minded Southern working-class,” “racist” and “racism” related responses, Southern “Klannishness,” and the idea that the KKK cannot exist successfully outside the Southern United States.<sup>115</sup> Chalmers goes so far as to state that KKK members find “excitement...inflicting pain,” even though he previously provided a scholarly

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<sup>111</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 21, 326.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 376.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 388.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 395.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 407, 414, 427.

explanation for the acceptance of violence as an approved tactic.<sup>116</sup> Chalmers further claims, “The Klan is an *available* Southern tradition,” despite his earlier descriptions of the KKK’s August 8, 1925, parade in Washington D.C., where it “took two hours for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey unit to parade by.”<sup>117</sup> The earlier adaptations of Chalmers’ work are scholarly and informative. Unfortunately, his later adaptation devolved primarily into clichés insulting the entire Southern portion of the United States, and intimating it is the only place extremism within the greater American society can be found, which is clearly not the case.

For example, on January 22, 1997, Ricky Salyers, thought to belong to the KKK, was arrested in Martinton, Illinois, for weapons violations after a search of his residence yielded 35,000 rounds of ammunition, grenades, and assorted military gear. On March 26, 1997, anti-government adherent Brendon Blaszczyk is arrested in Kalamazoo, Michigan, for manufacturing pipe bombs and other explosives, in a plot to bomb two Michigan federal buildings.<sup>118</sup> On April 28, 2000, white supremacist Richard Baumhann murders six people, while on a racially motivated shooting spree in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.<sup>119</sup> On April 19, 2001, white supremacists Leo Felton and Erica Chase were arrested in Boston, Massachusetts for using counterfeit money.<sup>120</sup> Authorities determined later that the couple, already in possession of a timing device, planned to bomb Jewish and minority landmarks, and assassinate Jewish and minority leaders.<sup>121</sup> On April 4, 2009, white supremacist Richard Andrew Poplawski kills three police

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<sup>116</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 431, 376.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 429, 286–287.

<sup>118</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing” 3.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*; Martha Neil, “Lawyer Convicted, Sentenced to Death in Slaying of 6 Says His Schizophrenia Was Undiagnosed,” *ABA Journal*, September 12, 2011, [http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer\\_convicted\\_sentenced\\_to\\_death\\_in\\_slaying\\_of\\_6\\_minorities/](http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_convicted_sentenced_to_death_in_slaying_of_6_minorities/).

<sup>120</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing.”

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

officers and wounds a fourth, during a domestic disturbance at his home in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.<sup>122</sup> In addition, according to the ADL and Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), Klan groups are present in the Northern United States as well, including Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, West Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire.<sup>123</sup> That said, the portions of Chalmers' work stemming from the earlier additions are scholarly and provide useful information to explain the backdrop of the KKK in the United States.<sup>124</sup>

## 2. SIT

While the individual groups differ, similarities do appear in SIT as it relates to the sovereign citizen movement. Literature on these groups helps to understand the motivation behind white supremacy adherence and group participation. In his work, *Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Only the Beginning*, Joel Dyer states, "More often than not, the...movement can provide an explanation that fits a person's particular circumstance like a glove, and more important, a hurting individual can find a group of empathetic supporters who help him hang on."<sup>125</sup> The importance of Dyer's work is that, while he does not reference the KKK, his observations apply to the individuals involved in that organization also. Applying Dyer's research, it explains that as personal circumstances lead a person to feel powerless and vulnerable, the self must act to preserve the individual.<sup>126</sup> Membership in the group helps the individuals understand they are not the failure, but rather the system has failed them.<sup>127</sup> This belief allows the individuals to recapture their personal identity, which fuses with

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<sup>122</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing."

<sup>123</sup> *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*; Southern Poverty Law Center, "Hate Map."

<sup>124</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing."

<sup>125</sup> Joel Dyer, *Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City Is Only The Beginning* (Westview Press, 1997), 52.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.



the collective membership of the group.<sup>128</sup> Identity no longer ties only to the individual, but to the group as well. Defense of the group ideology also becomes defense of self. Additionally, as more time is spent with like-minded individuals, groupthink opens them to accept more extreme views.

In their work *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann contend, the psychology of individuals produces their reality.<sup>129</sup> “Beyond this, however, the reality of everyday life is ongoingly affirmed in the individual’s interaction with others.”<sup>130</sup> Berger and Luckman further explain the result of this interaction is the institutionalization of the social construction of the group’s reality.<sup>131</sup> Again applying the work to the KKK, in essence, like-minded individuals, with strong beliefs form the basis of the white supremacist movement. These individuals each bring their own reality into the organization, which meld together into the collective reality of the group. With the collective reality of a group, groupthink is more likely to occur, which leads to extremist acts considered justifiable. It is easy to see how a person can turn to violence in reaction to critical levels of stress and as groupthink takes over.

Henry Tajfel’s *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* addresses SIT in detail, which is the major work related to this theory. It explains in-group dynamics, and how individuals function within the group, along with how the in-group functions in relation to the out-group. When applying this work to the KKK, one idea of major significance is that with individuals fully enmeshed in the white supremacist movement, their group identity functions to the exclusion of their

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<sup>128</sup> Dyer, *Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City Is Only The Beginning*, 52–53.

<sup>129</sup> Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, 178.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

individual identity, and their new sense of self becomes based largely on belonging to the movement.<sup>132</sup> As this happens, individual identity ties to the group identity.

Fathali Moghaddam's *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context*, breaks down the basics of SIT into the following five tenets: "identity motivation," "centrality of social identity," "assessing social identity through social comparisons," "availability of cognitive alternatives," and "strategies for improving social identity."<sup>133</sup> Moghaddam then explains each tenet, which can in turn apply to members of the KKK. Important to take from Moghaddam's analysis is that comparisons of an individual to others determine the influence of both intergroup and out-group relations on that person. A positive view of the individual's own group, and their position within the group, is necessary to have a continued positive identity of both themselves and their associations. Moghaddam provides an insightful breakdown of Tajfel's work, which is useful in the application of the theory to individual groups and motivations for members. For instance, "identity motivation" explains how people seek a positive self-identity.<sup>134</sup> "Centrality of social identity" explains that this need for a positive self-identity leads individuals to associate with groups that fulfill this need.<sup>135</sup> "Assessing social identity through social comparisons" means individuals come to understand themselves by comparing their personal situations to those of others.<sup>136</sup> This comparison is an important component of intergroup relations, or relations between different groups or out-groups, because it provides individuals with the ability to influence their social comparison based on their choice of targets with which to

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<sup>132</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 19.

<sup>133</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 94–98.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

compare.<sup>137</sup> “Availability of cognitive alternatives” details how individuals must perceive their personal situation to be both stable and legitimate to fulfill their need for a positive self-identity.<sup>138</sup> The people who are sources of influence for an individual, whether religious leaders, political leaders, or popular individuals within society, can affect this tenet.<sup>139</sup> “Strategies for improving social identity” include measures individuals have available to improve their self-identity if they see themselves as inadequate.<sup>140</sup> These approaches include making intragroup, within an individual’s personal group or in-group, comparisons, moving to a higher status in-group, and transforming in-group traits to positive qualities.<sup>141</sup>

In his work, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy*, Moghaddam provides and explains his “staircase to terrorism” analogy.<sup>142</sup> The steps include the “ground floor,” where people have a self-interpretation of their individual identity, where individual feelings of relative deprivation adversely affect the individual.<sup>143</sup> The “first floor” is when a person develops inadequate personal identity because of perceived unfair treatment.<sup>144</sup> The “second floor” is often indicative of dictatorships when an individual acts independently of the population, referred to as the “paradox of oil,” and uses displacement to turn personal criticisms away from themselves and toward an external enemy or out-group.<sup>145</sup> On the “third floor,” individual morality is the foundation and peoples’ morality allows them to circumvent inhibitions and adopt

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<sup>137</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 96–97; Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Intergroup,” (n.d.), <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intergroup>.

<sup>138</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 97.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 97–98.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 32, 43–44.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 74.

“terrorist myths.”<sup>146</sup> From the “fourth floor,” an individual enters a terrorist organization in which the methods justify the outcomes and morality justifies any means to obtain a goal, including killing other human beings.<sup>147</sup> On the “fifth floor,” the individual conforms to the group “norms” and obeys the authority of the group leaders, which allows the individual to see terrorism as a viable strategy for achieving their goals.<sup>148</sup>

Moghaddam’s analogy is valuable for understanding the progression of radicalization within the group. Further, it is useful in applying counterterrorism strategies to individuals and groups. Soft power is applicable to lower levels on the “staircase,” while hard power is applicable to higher levels where de-radicalization efforts are not viable options. Currently, the Terrorism and Radicalisation Project’s (TERRA) research specialists have an interest in using the “staircase” model for policy development.<sup>149</sup> TERRA, a counterterrorism strategy, takes “a European approach to addressing terrorism from the point of view of prevention and de-radicalisation.”<sup>150</sup>

In their forthcoming work, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, David Brannan and Anders Strindberg provide a workbook for analyzing terrorist organizations, regardless of individual ideologies. Brannan and Strindberg use SIT to analyze groups, ideologies, and actions related to the contextual environment, which is necessary for determining the relevance of group actions or beliefs.<sup>151</sup> While some may believe the study of psychology is more practical for analysis, Brannan and Strindberg aptly explain this field fits more appropriately with study of the individual, as opposed to the

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<sup>146</sup> Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, 83–85.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 114, 123.

<sup>149</sup> Holly F. Young, Frederike Zwenk, and Magda Rooze, “A Review of the Literature on Radicalisation; and What It Means for TERRA” (TERRA, May 2013), 3.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>151</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 16.

group.<sup>152</sup> As previously discussed with Moghaddam's, Tajfel's, and Berger and Luckmann's work, the applications of SIT assists in understanding the necessity of a positive association of membership with the in-group.<sup>153</sup> The importance of Brannan and Strindberg's work is they provide an analytical framework useful in analyzing individual groups that uses analytical markers to assist with the analysis.<sup>154</sup> These markers include "honor-shame motivations," "challenge-response model," and "patron-client relationships."<sup>155</sup>

Brannan and Strindberg explain the "honor-shame" marker, where groups strive to defend their honor, as "virtually every social interaction outside the immediate family is seen as a contest for honor."<sup>156</sup> The idea of defending the honor of the group against any who would besmirch it flows directly into the "challenge-response" marker. In this model, Brannan and Strindberg identify three required elements, including challenge, perception, and response.<sup>157</sup> To clarify, a particular group receives an initial challenge, which it must perceive as such that elicits a requirement to respond for the purpose of defense and evaluation by society.<sup>158</sup> The "patron-client" marker details the vital relationship of the group, wherein the larger group, as patron, protects the smaller group or individual as client.<sup>159</sup> The client must reciprocate the protection of the patron in some form to solidify and continue the symbiotic relationship.<sup>160</sup> The analyst uses these markers in direct and intimate conjunction with each other never fully separating the honor challenge cycle from existing patron/client relationships or the group's view of Limited Good.

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<sup>152</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 17.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 26–27.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 37–40.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

Important components of this relationship, necessary for understanding actions, include the relationship of the in-group with the out-group, and society's perception and evaluation of the relationship, especially relative to the "challenge-response" actions.<sup>161</sup> Brannan and Strindberg also point out the necessity of avoiding bias, including an individual's, to produce the most vital analysis and avoid slanting the end product, which results in nothing useful for counterterrorism purposes.<sup>162</sup>

Brad Deardorff's, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, uses the framework of SIT in developing a new approach to counterterrorism efforts in the United States. Drawing on successes and failures in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, Deardorff suggests implementing "Regional Outreach Coordination Centers (ROC Centers)...to coordinate engagement activities and tailor local approaches" in counterterrorism efforts.<sup>163</sup> The importance of this idea is Deardorff suggests the necessity of SIT as the framework for the actions endorsed by the ROC Center. He argues that law enforcement officials engaged in the efforts focusing on the cognitive, evaluative, and emotional levels of SIT have a greater likelihood of successfully engaging the "other" and facilitating recategorization, decategorization, or cross-categorization across differing groups normally seen in opposition.<sup>164</sup> To explain, sustained engagement between groups normally seen in opposition necessarily engages individuals on a cognitive and an emotional level, as well as encourages evaluation of differing perspectives during discussion. The prolonged contact creates exposure to members of the out-group, which allows differing groups to interact and create new in-groups based on shared experiences. Ongoing interaction permits the possibility of seeing the "other" in a different light, and the increased ability to alter how the "other" is placed in a particular category. This

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<sup>161</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 40.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>163</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 223.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 189–190.

viewpoint provides an individual the opportunity to place the “other” in a different group than originally believed (recategorization), the chance to see the “other” may not fall into a previously held stereotype (decategorization), or the opportunity to see the possibility of mutually beneficial experiences (cross-categorization). Deardorff explains, “...ideologies, therefore, are best countered by creating experiences that conflict with preconceived stereotypes and the opponent’s narrative.”<sup>165</sup>

Deardorff’s work calls for an overarching national strategy on countering violent extremism, and he advocates implementation at the local level by having law enforcement agencies embrace the idea of community policing.<sup>166</sup> Throughout the work, Deardorff’s experience with primarily federal counterterrorism efforts is obvious, but he does acknowledge that many local agencies have embraced this policing model for years, while some lack the resources to engage the community fully.<sup>167</sup> He explains that what many local agencies call community policing is nothing more than community relations in the form of outreach programs.<sup>168</sup> Deardorff wisely explains the community policing efforts he advocates come with political risk and require great levels of understanding of not only the community, but the targeted group as well.<sup>169</sup> Deardorff’s work focuses on interactions with the American Muslim community and a counterterrorism effort related to the Salafi-jihadi narrative, but has the potential to be applicable to many different types of organizations.<sup>170</sup> His work is thorough and academically sound, while also backed by practical field experience. In addition to the vast amount of research he did, Deardorff included

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<sup>165</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 219.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 219–221.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 223.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 189, 186.

primary sources in his work, although was unable to identify the individuals specifically. It would be beneficial to see more references to his primary source work supplementing his academic research.

As with all the aforementioned contributions related to SIT, vital to understanding any relationship is the individuals' self-perceived positive identification with any number of groups, along with the increased positive self-perception of membership within a particular group, and the relationship of the in-group versus, or with, that of the perceived "other," or out-group. These components, taken together, assist with analysis and understanding of any individual group, terrorist or non-terrorist. Further, they assist with understanding the actions of any group within the context they are precipitated. Herein lies the vital importance of using SIT in the application of any counterterrorism policy. According to Sun Tzu, in *The Art of War*, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles."<sup>171</sup>

### **3. Ideology**

In his work, *Psychology of Terrorism*, Randy Borum suggests the following requirements exist related to ideology, which help explain white supremacist ideology. Ideology provides an unquestionable belief system that directs behavior toward a specific goal that serves a worthwhile cause.<sup>172</sup> This belief is an important consideration, in conjunction with SIT, to explain the acceptance of belief systems society in general considers taboo.

Most of the information about specific group ideology stems from literature produced by watchdog groups, such as the ADL and SPLC.<sup>173</sup> While these groups spend considerable resources investigating hate groups, the resulting

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<sup>171</sup> Sun Tzu and Lionel Giles, *The Art of War* (Start Publishing LLC, 2013), Kindle edition, loc 293.

<sup>172</sup> Randy Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism* (University of South Florida, 2004), 41–42.

<sup>173</sup> ADL, "About the Anti-Defamation League," n.d. <http://www.adl.org/about-adl/#.UiJSw3nYEBg>; Southern Poverty Law Center, "What We Do," (n.d.), <http://www.splcenter.org/what-we-do>.



literature comes from a potentially biased perspective. In her article, *"Purity is Danger: An Argument for Divisible Identities,"* Anna Simons explains the ADL and SPLC "track and condemn any group they suspect is separatist or supremacist, augmenting whatever surveillance government agencies may already be conducting."<sup>174</sup> This behavior hardly provides an academic or unbiased basis on which to analyze individual groups. The concern is that much law enforcement information stems from these particular sources without additional scrutiny, as opposed to law enforcement engaging in collecting primary source information. For example, many law enforcement bulletins specify these watchdog groups as source information, which leads to concerns when researchers fail to speak with the respective groups, but use secondary source information as the foundation for their literature, perspectives, or even actions that is evident in academic literature as well, where research products list watchdog groups as references for vital conclusions. While their product is valuable and necessary, whenever possible, researchers need to include primary sources to supplement the data obtained from other organizations, including the ADL and SPLC.

In his article, *"Right Wing Violence in North America,"* Jeffrey Kaplan also references the stance taken by the ADL regarding right-wing groups. Kaplan, although referencing the watchdog group numerous times, makes the point that the ADL considers themselves "self-appointed" enforcers against all right-wing ideology, unrelenting in their pursuit of any group in their crosshairs.<sup>175</sup> Kaplan appears, while using the ADL's material extensively, to provide an academic analysis in his work, however. This article, in addition to Kaplan's collaboration with Leonard Weinberg, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, is useful in gaining insight into the historical perspective of some right-wing organizations, in addition to ideologies, expansion, and decline of different

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<sup>174</sup> Anna Simons, "Purity Is Danger: An Argument for Divisible Identities," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12, no. 3–4 (2000): 186.

<sup>175</sup> Jeffrey Kaplan, "Right Wing Violence in North America," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7, no. 1 (1995): 76.

organizations. Further, without referencing it as such, Kaplan's analysis of ideology related to terrorist violence ties directly into SIT, which is highly useful related to this research.

Additionally, a blanket label for all white supremacist groups tends to be the norm, which simply is not an accurate or intellectually coherent way to describe this nuanced constellation of ideologically and action oriented diverse groups. No blanket ideology applies to all extreme right organizations. They are as individual as each group. Consider, for example, the (ABT and the AC, that function primarily for monetary gain and are classified as criminal gangs.<sup>176</sup> If these groups function as criminal enterprises, as opposed to race-based hate groups, they cannot be included in a blanket white supremacist explanation. Further, Christian Identity groups and groups that practice pagan religions do not embrace the same ideology, nor do they necessarily want the same, or even a similar ultimate outcome.<sup>177</sup> KKK groups, based primarily on race relations, cannot be lumped in with religious based organizations, although individual groups may combine both ideology and theology. Reuben Sawyer was the first to do this comparison.<sup>178</sup> Skinhead groups do not align with KKK groups when exploring the underlying music culture embraced by the skinhead organizations.<sup>179</sup> The examples of ideological diversity are as numerous as the groups and the ever-evolving actions and understanding of the events that occur around them. Even within a particular type of group, such as the KKK, blanket statements do not apply to the underlying ideology. For example, KKK leader Thom Robb's efforts to rebrand his group as eschewing violence for peaceful

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<sup>176</sup> *The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate*, 7; *National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends* (Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011), 31, 44, 76; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment.

<sup>177</sup> Kaplan, "Right Wing Violence in North America," 60; Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity," 44.

<sup>178</sup> Kaplan, "Right Wing Violence in North America," 51.

<sup>179</sup> Nick Lowels and Steve Silver, *White Noise: Inside the International Skinhead Scene* (London: Searchlight, 1998), 71.

protests and positive group image lie outside the norm of other KKK groups.<sup>180</sup> Each individual group, like society in general, defines itself by the members, geographic location, leadership, etc. This tendency, even within the academic community, to lump all extreme right organizations together under one ideology, is a major obstacle to critical understanding within the extant literature.

#### 4. Religion

Many members of these organizations subscribe to Christian Identity theology and Odinism. In his work, *Inside Terrorism*, Bruce Hoffman provides a general description of Christian Identity as a white supremacist religion that teaches white people are “chosen” by God and Jews are children of Satan.<sup>181</sup> Odinism is a pagan religion originating in Northern Europe, which is a warrior-based religion whose followers believe they will ascend to Valhalla upon death.<sup>182</sup> Jeffrey Kaplan, in *“Right Wing Violence in North America,”* provides a brief description of Odinism, “a reconstruction of the Viking-era Norse pantheon,” which plays on cultic beliefs, and leads anti-Semitic individuals “to conclude that, as Christianity is built on a Jewish foundation, it too must be swept away.”<sup>183</sup> This pagan belief is compelling to many in the white supremacist world, especially younger adherents, as evidenced by AC membership in the DFW area.<sup>184</sup> This research, however, focuses on a case involving a Christian Identity group, and Odinism is not a focus.

The major works in the field related to Christian Identity theology include James Aho’s, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, and Michael Barkun’s, *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement*, both of which over-generalize the theology’s nuances and fail

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<sup>180</sup> Kaplan, “Right Wing Violence in North America,” 49.

<sup>181</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Revised & enlarged (Columbia University Press, 2006), 109.

<sup>182</sup> Odin Brotherhood, “Odin Brotherhood,” (n.d.), <http://www.odinbrotherhood.com/>.

<sup>183</sup> Kaplan, “Right Wing Violence in North America,” 60.

<sup>184</sup> “Circle of Death,” Gangland.

to depend on primary source research. One major departure from this tendency is research by David Brannan's "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity." Brannan's work details the individual differences of groups within Christian Identity theology, and most importantly, makes use of primary source material to detail the differences other researchers fail to explain. He provides detailed descriptions and analysis of Seed-Line, Non-Seed Line, Rebellious, and Repentant Christian Identity theologies, in addition to a history of the foundational belief of British-Israelism.<sup>185</sup>

Primary source material is also available from individuals formerly involved with the Christian Identity movement. In his work, *Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City*, Kerry Noble details the metamorphosis of the former Christian Identity based group CSA. The group began as a fundamentalist Christian organization called Zarephath, later transitioned to Zarephath-Horeb, with the group living in a commune in the Ozark Mountains on the Arkansas-Missouri border.<sup>186</sup> With the help of their leader, James Ellison, they morphed into a hard line militia group practicing Seed-Line Christian Identity theology, calling themselves the CSA.<sup>187</sup> In addition to Noble's first-hand account, Brannan provides, in his work, academic analysis based on primary source interviews with Noble himself, which again underlies the previously stated gap of the lack of primary source research, and critical academic analysis based on being in the field and engaging people with first-hand knowledge.

## **5. Technology**

The main work in relation to the technological advances of white supremacist organizations is Adam Klein's *A Space for Hate: The White Power*

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<sup>185</sup> Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity," 30, 44.

<sup>186</sup> Kerry Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City*, 1st ed. (Voyageur Pub, 1998), 29, 64; *The Covenant, the Sword, the Arm of the Lord* (Kansas City, Missouri: Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2, 1982), sec. Memorandum dated July 2, 1982, 1.

<sup>187</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 29, 73, 88, 100.

*Movement's Adaptation into Cyberspace*. Klein did perform primary source research in that he analyzed active white supremacist websites. Again, the information appears biased and Klein specifically informs the reader his grandparents were Holocaust survivors.<sup>188</sup> Despite this explicit hermeneutic frame and pre-suppositional starting point, Klein provides a look into the future of the white supremacist movement with his research.

To begin, Klein suggests looking to the history of using technology for promotion of propaganda. The release of media promoting anti-Semitism dates back to Russia in the late 1800s with the release of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.<sup>189</sup> Perhaps the most well known historical use of technology for propaganda promotion comes from Nazi Germany. Hitler created the Ministry of Public Enlightenment to control the release of all media, to include print, cinema, and radio, and ensure “the voices of a few translated into the voice of a nation.”<sup>190</sup> The Ministry of Public Enlightenment distributed radios to the German citizens, with the goal of playing on the fears of the citizenry to gain compliance and support, and controlled all information disseminated over the airwaves.<sup>191</sup>

Due to the history of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, much of Central Europe has federal legal restraints against hate speech and Holocaust denial.<sup>192</sup> With publication illegal in Germany, an increased presence on the Internet is originating in the United States, which leads to an increased U.S. influence in the worldwide white supremacist movement.<sup>193</sup> Since First Amendment protections make similar laws and prosecution difficult in the United States, most production,

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<sup>188</sup> Adam G. Klein, *A Space for Hate: The White Power Movement's Adaptation Into Cyberspace* (Litwin Books, 2010), 26.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, 49–50.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 53–54.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 55–56.

<sup>192</sup> Leonard Weinberg and Jeffrey Kaplan, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right* (Rutgers University Press, 1998), 60.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 2.

and sale of current white supremacist literature, occurs within U.S. borders.<sup>194</sup> An additional barrier to prosecution is the overall structure of the Internet itself, with multiple servers, Internet Service Providers (ISP), and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.<sup>195</sup> The ramification of the growing U.S. influence on the Internet is that the white supremacist movement is no longer confined and localized, but rather globalized. For instance, the website of the Hammerskin Nation displays patches and flags of all chapters, both national and international.<sup>196</sup> In addition, launched in 1995, Stormfront.org, currently producing internationally in multiple languages, was the first hate website on the Internet.<sup>197</sup>

The literature also states the white supremacist movement has latched onto the fact that educated young people frequently use the Internet for social networking and research, and the movement now uses it to target white youth in higher education.<sup>198</sup> They, like most organized groups, want only the best. To attract these young people, the white supremacist movement has toned down the hate speech and addresses current social issues.<sup>199</sup> For example, the economic crisis, the election of the first black U.S. president, and the immigration debate, serve as building blocks to attract young, white, conservative individuals.<sup>200</sup> Once engaged, the movement is more likely to recruit like-minded individuals successfully.

The importance of this engagement is the globalization of the white supremacist movement. In *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, Leonard Weinberg and Jeffrey Kaplan detail the global connections as music production decreases the distance between the nations.<sup>201</sup> Klein seconds this

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<sup>194</sup> Weinberg and Kaplan, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, 60.

<sup>195</sup> Klein, *A Space for Hate*, 31.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Weinberg and Kaplan, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, 60.

issue of globalization in relation to technology decreasing the distance between borders as well.<sup>202</sup> Further, Weinberg and Kaplan acknowledge that most literature on the subject is biased and they attempt to present their analysis in an unbiased manner.<sup>203</sup> While technology and recruiting are not the focus of this research, it is necessary to understand the future of the white supremacist movement to appreciate the need to apply counterterrorism strategies to the individual groups.

## **6. Counterterrorism Studies**

In his work, *Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity*, Robert Deardorff suggested restructuring processes to counter violent extremism as it relates to Islamism by using a “balanced-power approach.”<sup>204</sup> This method of combining both hard and soft power has been successful in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the United States, Deardorff suggests using the community to notify law enforcement when it believes an individual is susceptible or undergoing the process of radicalization. Moderate clerical leaders within the Muslim community can then step in to counsel the individual and intervene. An open and transparent relationship with the Muslim community can help improve its comfort levels when hard power is necessary, such as the active involvement of law enforcement to interrupt a suspected terrorist plot. Further, this relationship of trust can lead the community to come forward with possible radicalization within its midst, and thereby, allow law enforcement and religious leaders to intervene.<sup>205</sup> The premise is to build bridges with the Muslim community and utilize it in to predict and prevent radicalization among its members. Genuine collaboration, reforms, and open

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<sup>202</sup> Klein, *A Space for Hate*, 2, 17.

<sup>203</sup> Weinberg and Kaplan, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right*, 1–2.

<sup>204</sup> Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 119.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 119–124.

lines of communication have proven effective in countering radicalization and the decline of some organizations.<sup>206</sup>

During the Troubles, the soft power approach proved successful, and the United Kingdom attempted to address Islamist terrorism following 9/11 in a similar fashion by embracing the Prevent Strategy, which is part of the UK's CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. CONTEST is a "balanced approach that incorporates both hard and soft power: aggressive military action and policing to disrupt terrorist operations paired with engagement strategies designed to stop the flow of new recruits and cut off support for terrorist organizations."<sup>207</sup> The Prevent component of CONTEST builds its foundation on the expectation that community involvement in the prevention of terrorism is vital and expected.<sup>208</sup> The Prevent strategy is not without its critics, as detailed in H. A. Hellyer's, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*. It is important to consider the failures of the program when seeking application of the ideas to a different organization; in this case, white supremacists. While Prevent and Deardorff's "balanced-power" base their methods on religious affiliation, white supremacists do not fall in that category. The models, however, have the common goal of reducing violent extremism from within the ranks of whatever group they target. The goal, then, is to further the research in the effort to apply the models and lessons learned to a different group for the purpose of counterterrorism efforts.

In his article, "Confronting Terrorism," Gregory Miller details state counterterrorism methods and divides down into the four response categories of doing nothing, conciliation, legal reform, restriction, and violence.<sup>209</sup> Miller further explains that problem of ignoring the distinguishing characteristics of individual

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<sup>206</sup> Berlet and Lyons, "Militia Nation," 25; Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 119; Dyer, *Harvest of Rage*, 251.

<sup>207</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 46.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>209</sup> Gregory D. Miller, "Confronting Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 3 (2007): 335.



groups, which is problematic since no one particular policy or response is successful for confronting all terrorist organizations.<sup>210</sup> In Miller's work, the most important conclusion for this research relates to groups Miller classifies as "reactionary," which includes right-wing organizations.<sup>211</sup> Although previously stating the importance of considering the motivations of individual groups, Miller lumps all right-wing organizations into this one category, including groups from around the globe. Although the analysis does not focus on individual characteristics, Miller asserts that legal reform is the most successful method of countering right-wing organizations, including targeting their financial sources, which he bases on previous successful civil litigation with some groups, including one faction of the KKK.<sup>212</sup> Miller's analysis does yield helpful information that legal reform should be part of any policy directed at countering white supremacist violent extremism. Kaplan's *"Right Wing Violence in North America"* and Simons' *"Purity is Danger: An Argument for Divisible Identities"* discuss counterterrorism strategies as well. The importance of both articles is the extensive use of SIT and analytical markers to explain the actions of right-wing groups. While not specifically named as such, both pieces discuss group solidarity and motivations for action. Kaplan describes actions and ideology in terms akin to Brannan and Strindberg's "challenge-response" model, and Simons specifically refers to identity throughout the piece. The importance is SIT permeates academia's discussion, but it has not specifically applied the theory to counterterrorism studies until Brannan and Strindberg's work, which underscores the necessity of the application of SIT to successful counterterrorism policy with any terrorist organization within the United States.

Ed Husain's, *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left*, provides a primary source account of his association with radical Islam. While related to Islamist radicalization, rather than KKK

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<sup>210</sup> Miller, "Confronting Terrorism," 332–333.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., 340–341.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., 341.

affiliation, useful parallels should be considered. Husain details his recruitment and radicalization, along with what led him to separate from the movement. Like Noble's personal account, it is not academic literature, but provides great insight into the mind of the individual and the necessary requirements for counterterrorism efforts. When drafting policy for efforts to counter violent extremism, the government must be willing to work with any individuals who renounce violence as a way to further extremist beliefs.<sup>213</sup>

### C. CONCLUSION

Obstacles remain with addressing terrorism from traditionally right-wing organizations.<sup>214</sup> Although America has seen individuals with right-wing ties commit acts of terror, few had the open support of a terrorist organization.<sup>215</sup> For instance, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols held strong ties to the right-wing anti-government movement, but had neither association with, nor the open support of, a particular organization for their actions in the Oklahoma City bombing.<sup>216</sup> In addition, the problem with addressing these belief systems is very little unbiased, primary source, academic literature is available relating to white supremacists. The gap makes it necessary to apply relevant literature in other disciplines to members within the movement. These outside disciplines help explain and understand belief systems different from those held by the researcher.

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<sup>213</sup> H. A. Hellyer, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, July 2011), 42.

<sup>214</sup> David W. Brannan, "Left- and Right-wing Political Terrorism," *The Politics of Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (November 3, 2005): 55.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Dyer, *Harvest of Rage*, 214–235.

Another major weakness is much of the available literature exhibits a strong bias against members of the white supremacist movement, and stems from information provided by watchdog groups like the ADL and the SPLC.<sup>217</sup> Not to belittle the efforts and valuable contributions of these groups, but primary source material is used limitedly in the available research, which has simply led to an acceptance of using “secondary data” in studies related to any terrorist organization.<sup>218</sup>

In addition, little is offered about countering violent extremism within this sector of domestic terrorist organizations. While academic literature related to right-wing organizations and possible counterterrorism suggestions is available, the researcher did not find literature regarding what methods were used in countering violent extremism within these groups, nor if any methods found success, which is a major weakness, especially as domestic terrorism is a concern for the DHS and the future of the homeland security enterprise.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Jeffrey Kaplan, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right* (Rutgers University Press, 1998), 1–2.

<sup>218</sup> David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N.T. Anders Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24 (2001): 7.

<sup>219</sup> Seals, “CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the White House,” 2.

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## IV. METHODOLOGY

The problem addressed in this research is countering violent extremism within the white supremacist KKK organization in Texas. Throughout its history, the KKK has seen multiple declines and resurgences. Since the KKK is alive and well in the United States, it is necessary to understand its ideology and motivations, and determine methods to mitigate extremist violence posed by far right members within the organization. Extremism will never be abolished, but it is necessary to counter extremist violence.

This research addresses five important questions related to the white extremist issues.

- Is it possible to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?
- Are there generational differences in leadership that effect interactions with the group?
- Does religion influence race relations?
- What induces participation in the group?
- Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to counter violent extremism from within the KKK?

This research uses the case study method, and utilizing a holistic multiple-case study approach, compares two separate cases involving former leaders who prevented, or aborted, acts of domestic terrorism from their organizations.<sup>220</sup> The research details the events involving each leader, along with their insights into the organizations, and the overall white supremacist culture. Data sources include literature and approved interviews with the specific leaders of a Texas KKK group and an Arkansas Christian Identity group, following the detailed methodology for human subject research, provided by the university’s Institutional Review Board.<sup>221</sup> The primary goal of the interviews was to

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<sup>220</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods: 5 (Applied Social Research Methods)*, 4th ed. (Sage Publications, Inc., 2008), 59–60.

<sup>221</sup> Naval Postgraduate School, Research Office, “IRB Application Packages,” (n.d.), [http://www.nps.edu/Research/IRB\\_Applications.htm](http://www.nps.edu/Research/IRB_Applications.htm).

determine if general knowledge of a specific group's ideologies provides enough information for law enforcement and counterterrorism leaders going forward to establish a process of countering violent extremism, specifically from within the KKK in Texas. The researcher transcribed and categorized the interviews in relation to the five themes in the research questions. The researcher focused on the reasons for each leader's decision to interrupt, or abort, a terrorist plot to determine if similarities exist to make replication of these case studies possible.<sup>222</sup>

## **A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Using a theoretical framework, the theory becomes a method for generalization of the data to similar cases.<sup>223</sup> This framework also assists with focusing attention on the relevant data, and guides the data analysis process.<sup>224</sup> This research intends to look at the white supremacist movement through the lens of SIT. SIT is useful in explaining the relationship of the individual to the group, and how that relationship affects a person's identity. Fathali Moghaddam identifies the basics of SIT in his work *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*. Moghaddam divides the basics of the theory into the following five tenets: "identity motivation," "centrality of social identity," "assessing social identity through social comparisons," "availability of cognitive alternatives," and "strategies for improving social identity."<sup>225</sup>

To explain what these mean before application to the research, it begins with the individual. The central idea of SIT is the individual desire to establish a distinct identity, which affects a person in a positive way.<sup>226</sup> Individuals experience no benefit in establishing identities that make them feel bad about themselves, or reflect themselves in a negative light. Next, SIT suggests that

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<sup>222</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research*, 59.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 94–98.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., 94.

individuals, in search of this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to join a group that will fulfill their emotional needs.<sup>227</sup> The group will be of like-minded individuals, who bolster the new member, and increase the positive feelings associated with their identity.

SIT places the most importance on this issue because the individual identity ties to the group membership in that it enables the individual to join the group.<sup>228</sup> Once inside the group, individuals make social comparisons between themselves and both members of the group and those outside the group.<sup>229</sup> These comparisons of an individual to others determine the influence of both intergroup and out-group relations on that individual. Individuals necessarily self-identify as members of particular groups as part of both their personal and social identity.<sup>230</sup> The group to which individuals belong and feel a positive identity is their in-group, and members of opposing groups or “the other,” are out-groups.<sup>231</sup>

Interactions between different groups constitute intergroup relations, while those within a particular group are intragroup relations.<sup>232</sup> A positive view of individuals’ own group, as well as their position within the group, is necessary to have a continued positive identity of both themselves and their associations. Those within the group who have a superior group association will attempt to keep things as they are, while those members with an inferior group association will attempt to change things and elevate their status to improve their positive identity.<sup>233</sup> As those dissatisfied members seek to improve their association, they

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<sup>227</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 95.

<sup>228</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 21.

<sup>229</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 96.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, 101; Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 27.

<sup>232</sup> Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Intergroup,” (n.d.), <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intergroup>; Merriam-Webster, “Intragroup,” (n.d.), <http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/intragroup?show=0&t=1378173729>.

<sup>233</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 139–140.

have some options. The individual member can move to a group with higher status, and therefore, more positive identity associations. If the dissatisfaction is a collective behavior of the group, they can respond as a group to the minority status and challenge the higher status group.<sup>234</sup>

Another important consideration regarding group behavior is the notion of cultural markers as an analytical framework that explains the nuances of the behavior. Every group association has a patron and client relationship. One is providing and one is receiving some benefit to the symbiotic relationship. The “patron-client” marker details the vital relationship of the group, wherein the larger group, as patron, protects the smaller group or individual as client.<sup>235</sup> The client must reciprocate the protection of the patron in some form to solidify and continue the relationship.<sup>236</sup> Important components of this relationship, necessary for understanding actions, include the relationship of the in-group with the out-group, and society’s perception and evaluation of the relationship, especially relative to the “challenge-response” actions.<sup>237</sup>

The notion of honor and shame is also important, which relates to social capital rather than actual currency. Without honor, a group is useless. The capital is a limited good and not an endless commodity, whatever that capital is for the particular transaction. Again, it is social capital as opposed to items of economic value. Brannan and Strindberg explain the “honor-shame” marker, in which groups strive to defend their honor, as “virtually every social interaction outside the immediate family is seen as a contest for honor.”<sup>238</sup> The idea of defending the honor of the group against any who would besmirch it flows directly into the “challenge-response” marker. In this model, Brannan and Strindberg identify

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<sup>234</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 98.

<sup>235</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 40.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., 37.



three required elements, including challenge, perception, and response.<sup>239</sup> To clarify, an initial challenge to a particular group occurs, which they must perceive as such, that then elicits a requirement to respond for the purpose of defense and evaluation by society.<sup>240</sup> Should the group see an action as a challenge, it is obliged to respond. Response allows the group to avoid the loss of honor, or any transaction capital it defends.<sup>241</sup> Finally, Brannan and Strindberg also emphasize the necessity of avoiding bias, including a person's own, to produce the most vital analysis and avoid slanting the end product, which results in nothing useful for counterterrorism purposes.<sup>242</sup>

## **B. SETTING**

This research occurred in DFW, in the state of Texas. Based on the interest of the researcher, this geographical location was the area of focus. Neither case pertains to events that occurred in DFW, but both former leaders are from the surrounding area and are familiar with local demographics, as well as white supremacist organizations within the vicinity. The interviews occurred in physical locations of the particular individual's choosing.

The former CSA Identity leader, Mr. Kerry Noble, chose his home as the interview location. The researcher met another individual, who verified the subject agreed to the intrusion, prior to receiving the exact location of the subject's residence on the property. The residence was rural and the subject's wife was present in the home at the time of the interview, but not in the room physically. The interview occurred in the subject's home office, where the researcher and subject sat on opposite side of the subject's desk. The room had bookshelves on three sides and a window on the wall behind the subject's desk.

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>240</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 38.

<sup>241</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, "The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security."

<sup>242</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 54.

All shelves and some desk corners were full of books covering a variety of subjects from religion to fiction. The room, immaculately clean and well ordered, was comfortable for the researcher and subject alike. No distractions arose and the welcoming environment was conducive to the interview process, which was uninterrupted in its entirety.

The former KKK leader, Mr. Robert L. Spence, Jr., chose a public place as the location for his interview. The researcher met Mr. Spence at a McDonald's restaurant in Mesquite, Texas. It was lunchtime and the group, which included Mr. Spence's spouse, was at a corner table. Several other people were at the location, but it was not full. Despite the other people present at the location, no distractions arose and the interview proceeded uninterrupted.

### **C. PARTICIPANTS**

The subjects involved in the research were English speaking, white males, both in their sixties; one was sixty-one and the other sixty-eight. They both come from a lower level socio-economic status, and had multiple years experience within their respective organizations. The researcher selected both individuals from the population based on their personal experiences as former leaders within white supremacist organizations, and their involvement in disrupted, or aborted, domestic terror plots aimed at igniting a racial holy war (RAHOWA).<sup>243</sup>

Due to their former positions within their respective organizations and their involvement in potential domestic terror incidents, they were uniquely qualified to discuss themes related to the research questions. The themes included generational leadership and ideological differences, reasons for participation, the feasibility of the success of the "balanced-power" method, and effective methods to counter white supremacist violent extremism. The researcher compared both cases for similarities and common themes related to the research questions.

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<sup>243</sup> RAHOWA.US, "Creativity Awake! Prepare for Survival," (n.d.), <http://www.rahowa.us/index2.html>.

The researcher compared a KKK case study to a case study involving a former leader within the CSA. The researcher chose the CSA leader based on his decisions to abort a terrorist plot within his organization.<sup>244</sup> Data sources related to the CSA case study came from literature and interviews. The analysis sought to determine patterns and causal relationships relevant to countering violent extremism.

The KKK case study forming the core of the research detailed the decisions of a KKK leader to disrupt a terrorist plot within his organization.<sup>245</sup> Both cases detail a successful intervention that did not involve outside deterrence to prevent the specific domestic terror incident. This research compares the KKK case with the CSA case to determine if “balanced-power” may successfully counter violent extremism committed by white supremacist adherents.<sup>246</sup> The purpose was to determine a potential base ideal that would demonstrate a successful “balanced-power” approach, and potentially lead to cooperation by leaders within the KKK.<sup>247</sup> This core independent variable may be the one belief common among adherents, that which is taboo enough, to encourage betrayal of their sworn oath for protecting their brothers.

#### **D. MEASUREMENT**

The researcher asked each individual 14 questions detailing their thoughts about the themes outlined in the research questions. The questions included their views on religion, recruitment, leadership, law enforcement, violence, and collaboration efforts. The researcher matched each question to one of the five research categories, which allowed the researcher to determine commonalities in

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<sup>244</sup> Katherine Bishop, “Plot Against U.S. Described In Court,” *New York Times*, February 28, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/28/us/plot-against-us-described-in-court.html?>; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*.”

<sup>245</sup> Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.”

<sup>246</sup> Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 19.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

answers to each question, related to the research categories. The researcher asked each subject the following questions.

- How did you get involved with the organization?
- Why did you join?
- Why do others join?
- What do you see as the relationship between different races?
- Do you participate in organized religion?
- What are your thoughts on Christian Identity?
- How do you recruit new members?
- Is there a difference in leadership with different generations?
- What are your feelings toward law enforcement?
- Would you ever trust them?
- Does your organization condone violence?
- Could a relationship be developed between your organization and law enforcement?
- Who would need to be involved?
- What approach would you suggest?

Again, the researcher measured responses related to the following themes.

- Is it possible to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?
- Are there generational differences in leadership that effect interactions with the group?
- Does religion influence race relations?
- What induces participation in the group?
- Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to counter violent extremism from within the KKK?

The research questions were as follows.

- Questions nine (9), ten (10), and eleven (11) related to theme one, the possibility of countering KKK violent extremism.
- Question eight (8) related to theme two, generational leadership differences.
- Questions four (4), five (5), and six (6) related to theme three, religious influence on race relations.

- Questions one (1), two (2), three (3), and seven (7) related the theme four, group participation.
- Questions twelve (12), thirteen (13), and fourteen (14), related to theme five, the possible effectiveness of “balanced-power.”

For valid research protocols and findings, it is necessary for the researcher to establish construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability, related to the process, data analysis, and findings.<sup>248</sup> Construct validity refers to the use and adherence to standard operational measures during the research process, including the identification of known gaps in the available literature.<sup>249</sup> The researcher addressed construct validity by using multiple sources for research, including literature, interviews, and primary source publications. The researcher ensured the integrity during data collection by personally maintaining all data, including identifiers, in separate locations from other research materials, which were password protected and only accessible by the researcher. Each subject interviewed reviewed the final research products related to their individual case studies for verification and clarification purposes, prior to final submission by the researcher. Internal validity relates to the researcher making valid inferences when seeking causal relationships for cause and effect circumstances.<sup>250</sup> To ensure inferences for cause and effect relationships were valid, the researcher used pattern matching in the data analysis to look for common themes related to both individual questions and overall research themes. A theoretical framework supported the results during the data analysis and explanation building process, as opposed to the researcher using personal knowledge alone to infer causal relationships. To avoid invalid inferences, the researcher provided rival explanations to the research findings, when available. External validity relates to whether findings are generalizable to other cases.<sup>251</sup> Again, for both cases, the researcher applied a theoretical

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<sup>248</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research*, 40–45.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., 41–42.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., 42–43.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., 43–44.

framework to the research process and findings, in addition to replicating the process and theory for both cases. Reliability refers to whether a research process is repeatable should a different researcher have similar cases and all available research processes.<sup>252</sup> To ensure reliability, the researcher documented all procedures, interview questions, and data the same way in both cases. A spreadsheet served for tracking all procedures, data, and analysis for both cases as well. With detailed procedural documentation and data collection, another researcher can easily repeat the process.

## **E. DATA COLLECTION**

The interviews occurred at a time and place chosen by the research subject, to increase the comfort level with the researcher and the process of providing sensitive personal information, potentially seen as taboo by society. As the subjects may become uncomfortable sharing their personal experiences and involvement with a white supremacist organization, the researcher attempted to accommodate the individuals during the interview process that included not only performing all interviews at a time and location chosen by the subject, and in the company of anyone the subject opted to include, but also provided all consent documentation prior to the interviews so subjects could review the procedures and obtain any needed clarification. The researcher made the subjects aware of reasons requiring termination of interviews, as well as ensuring subjects understood they could refuse or terminate the interviews at any time. Subjects also had the option of approving audio recording during the interview process, as well as the option of selecting anonymity during the entire process, including the final research product.

Each interview lasted between one and two hours, and was audio recorded with the permission of the subject. The researcher provided all subjects a consent release prior to the interview for the purpose of review, which allowed time to answer any questions that might arise. At the beginning of the initial

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<sup>252</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research*, 45.

interviews, the researcher obtained signed consent forms and covered topics including anonymity and the use of quotes attributed to the individual. Upon the conclusion of the research, the individual subjects reviewed and approved any direct quotes, and any information attributed directly to them, prior to inclusion in the final research product. The researcher de-identified, as needed, all notes, recordings, transcripts, and documentation related to the interviews, and provided all information to the university's Institutional Review Board for storage.

## **F. DATA ANALYSIS**

After collection, the researcher organized data obtained from the individual case studies in relation to the research questions. The researcher matched individual interview questions to specific research questions. The researcher matched any additional data that emerged to the research questions as well. As a theoretical framework, the researcher applied SIT to the specific research questions and additional emergent themes obtained during the interview process to allow for the categorization of similar themes and ideologies that emerged during the research process. The researcher also used specific quotes to assist in illustrating the individual themes that emerged related to the research questions.

The researcher coded the interview questions both individually, and related to the five research themes. For case comparison, the researcher created a Word table for each individual question, as well as for each research category.<sup>253</sup> This table made it possible to determine cross-case similarities and patterns more easily. While the analytical method relies on the researcher's interpretation of the data, the method is analogous to cross-experiment interpretation methods using quantitative data.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research*, 160.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

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## V. KKK CASE STUDY

On April 22, 1997, authorities arrested Shawn and Catherine Adams and Edward Taylor, Jr. for conspiracy to bomb a natural gas processing plant owned by Mitchell Energy & Development Corp., located in Wise County, Texas, 90 minutes northwest of Dallas. The bombing was to divert attention from an armored car robbery, which they believed carried two million dollars.<sup>255</sup> Carl Jay Waskom, Jr., arrested later, also participated in the conspiracy.<sup>256</sup> The four also had plans to detonate a secondary device aimed at first responders arriving at the initial explosion.<sup>257</sup> In the ensuing tragedy of two explosions, the foursome felt they could complete the robbery unimpeded.<sup>258</sup> Depending on the source, the plans for the proceeds differ and the foursome intended to either ignite a long awaited racial holy war, or start a war with the U.S. government.<sup>259</sup>

Little is available via open sources regarding what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) coined "Operation Sour Gas."<sup>260</sup> What literature that is available details the operation as a several week investigation, which originated with the tip from a witness to the planning operations.<sup>261</sup> Several sources identify, although not corroborated by the FBI, the informant as Robert Leslie Spence, Jr., Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the leader

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<sup>255</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing"; Wallace, "Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas Processing Plant"; Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; "Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5."

<sup>256</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing"; Wallace, "Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas Processing Plant"; Poverty Law Center, "Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City."

<sup>257</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5."

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5"; Spence, interview.

<sup>260</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5."

<sup>261</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Verhovek, "U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot."

of the foursome's Klavern.<sup>262</sup> While some sources provide a harsh view of Spence, or offer information he refutes, others provide a factual reporting of the circumstances. According to the SPLC in, *Terror from the Right: 75 Plots: Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City*, and "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing," Spence entered the federal witness protection program, which is not the case.<sup>263</sup> The SPLC sources also state that Spence was originally a co-conspirator who got cold feet and turned in his accomplices to the authorities, which he refutes.<sup>264</sup> Christine Biederman, in her *Texas Monthly* article, "Ku Klux Klowns," accurately explains that Spence declined to enter the witness protection program and that Spence originally contacted authorities in March 1997 upon learning the details of the foursome's plans.<sup>265</sup> Biederman's article, based on primary source interviews, provides more facts than the information produced by the ADL and the SPLC, although in a potentially insulting manner. *The New York Times* and *Texas News* presented factual articles based on the FBI's reporting of events, which do not name Spence directly, but simply refer to an "informant."<sup>266</sup> In his

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<sup>262</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, "Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City," 9; Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; ADL, "Poisoning the Web—The Ku Klux Klan: Burning Crosses in Cyberspace," (n.d.), [http://archive.adl.org/poisoning\\_web/kkk.asp](http://archive.adl.org/poisoning_web/kkk.asp); Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing"; Paul D. Brister, "Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns" (PhD diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 20–21; Mohammed M. Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, *Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2012), 20; Mike Malloy, "April (Gun) Showers," *Huff Post Politics*, March 30, 2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-malloy/april-gun-showers\\_b\\_519274.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-malloy/april-gun-showers_b_519274.html); Kenneth Skelton, *Why They Just Can't Get Over It: A Spiritual And Psychological Approach To Overcoming Racism in America* (iUniverse, Incorporated, 2007), 68–69; Spence, interview.

<sup>263</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing"; "Southern Poverty Law Center, "Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City"; Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Spence, interview.

<sup>264</sup> Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, "Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing"; "Southern Poverty Law Center, "Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City"; Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Spence, interview.

<sup>265</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Spence, interview.

<sup>266</sup> Verhovek, "U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot - New York Times"; Wallace, "Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas Processing Plant"; Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5."

work, *Why They Just Can't Get Over It: A Spiritual and Psychological Approach to Overcoming Racism in America*, Kenneth Skelton applauds Spence for "not being totally taken over by hatred and working with the F.B.I. to ruin these plans."<sup>267</sup>

Two academic papers reference "Operation Sour Gas" in discussing acts of domestic terrorism. Major Paul Brister, in his work, *Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns*, states had Spence not "gotten cold feet," the plan may have succeeded.<sup>268</sup> This statement references its informational source as the SPLC's *Terror from the Right: 75 Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City*.<sup>269</sup> Spence refutes this claim, stating he was never involved in the plot as a co-conspirator, but rather as an FBI informant.<sup>270</sup> *Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II*, written by Mohammed Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, also discusses "Operation Sour Gas," stating the plan would never have succeeded because the leader of the plot, who they named as Spence, was an informant for the FBI all along.<sup>271</sup> According to Spence, this specific claim is accurate, although he refutes their references to him as a conspirator in the group.<sup>272</sup>

According to available sources, Spence learned of the plans to rob a drug dealer for funds to build a bomb.<sup>273</sup> The bomb was to blow up the Mitchell Energy & Development Corporation's natural gas processing plant in Wise County, Texas.<sup>274</sup> The explosion was a diversionary tactic to distract first

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<sup>267</sup> Skelton, *Why They Just Can't Get Over It*, 68–69.

<sup>268</sup> Brister, "Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns," 198–199.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>271</sup> Hafez and Rasmussen, *Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II*, 20–21.

<sup>272</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>273</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Spence, interview.

<sup>274</sup> Wallace, "Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas Processing Plant"; Spence, interview.

responders from an armored car robbery, the proceeds of which would finance a war against the U.S. government.<sup>275</sup> Spence, the Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, learned of his follower's intentions and went to the federal authorities with the details of the foursome's plans.<sup>276</sup> No one was suitable to place inside the KKK organization, and Spence, already an informant, agreed to work with the FBI during the investigation, which led to the arrest and conviction of all four co-conspirators.<sup>277</sup>

The following information is Robert "Bob" Spence's firsthand account of the events surrounding "Operation Sour Gas" and his involvement with the KKK, as related in a personal interview with the researcher on Thursday, September 5, 2013.

When Spence was six years old, his grandfather was a Klavern leader in McLennan County, Texas. Spence discovered the affiliation when he recognized his grandfather's boots as the group marched to a meeting and cross lighting ceremony. After that, Spence accompanied his grandfather to Klavern meetings. The KKK was a Spence family tradition, and they trace their lineage back to the original founders in Pulaski, Tennessee. From the age of 11 to 18, Spence, living with his grandfather, was not involved in the movement. While in the military, Spence met Tom Metzger in California and became active in the movement once again. Spence attended meetings in his Marine barracks in California.<sup>278</sup>

Although Spence joined the KKK as a family tradition, many join to avoid paying taxes and because they do not trust the federal government. "Some people join just because they want a sense of belonging somewhere." In addition, the meetings are family oriented and out of respect for the women and children present, Klaverns forbid drugs and alcohol in the meetings. This family orientation also feeds a desire in some to join for that "sense of having a family."

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<sup>275</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5"; Spence, interview.

<sup>276</sup> Biederman, "Ku Klux Klowns"; Spence, interview.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>278</sup> Spence, interview.

Most of the membership is not violent, nor do they want to participate in the cells Louis Beam encouraged his fellow Klansmen to form in a technique he called “leaderless resistance.”<sup>279</sup>

When a cell forms within a Klavern, the leadership is aware of individuals spending more time together, but they are not privy to the information exchange within the cell. The cells are small, secretive, and careful which members they allow to join. This method, while the largest threat from the KKK, is effective at protecting not only the cell members, but the KKK leadership as well. The leadership also does not press members for further information, mainly from fear of prosecution under federal organized crime laws, or the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO).<sup>280</sup> When asked if RICO was the main reason for leaders to disavow violence, Spence responded, “pretty much,” which leads to the KKK’s stance that the organization does not condone violence, although individual members may. According to fellow Klansman Beam, “What I don’t know can’t hurt me.”<sup>281</sup>

Spence emphasizes the violence seen in the movement was not indicative of his grandfather’s Klan. As a young boy, he saw his grandfather feed poor blacks, despite having little himself. Seeing people willing to kill others based on their skin color disappointed Spence and led him to volunteer his services as a confidential informant for the FBI. Spence was, in fact, an FBI informant during the time he learned of the plot in Wise County.<sup>282</sup>

In 1997, Spence was the Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.<sup>283</sup> During that time his organization had a cell whose members included Eddie Taylor, Jay Waskom, and Catherine and Shawn Adams. The

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<sup>279</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>280</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, “USAM 9-110.000 Organized Crime and Racketeering,” n.d. [http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia\\_reading\\_room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm](http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm).

<sup>281</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.”

Adams couple also had a son involved in the discussions, but who was not allowed to participate in their plans. Taylor, not knowing their leader was a long time FBI informant, asked Spence to join the group as they planned to bomb Mitchell Energy in Wise County. After contacting the FBI, and determining no suitable candidates were available to infiltration the organization in an undercover capacity, Spence agreed to work with the cell. Although some sources claim Spence was a co-conspirator who was too afraid to follow through with the attack, Spence corrects that information and explains he was never involved in the operation as anything other than an informant.<sup>284</sup>

Taylor, who previously worked at Mitchell Energy, told the group approximately six sour gas tanks were on site at the facility. Sour gas forms a cloud only dispersed by heavy rainstorms, and given the estimated amount of sour gas present, the cloud would span a distance of around 50 square miles, which would kill everything in its path. Depending on the wind direction at the time of the explosion, the FBI felt the cloud could reach the DFW Metroplex, causing untold deaths. The group planned to plant one bomb by the front entrance and five or six more inside the refinery by the tanks. The single device by the entrance was a distraction device intended for law enforcement personnel initially responding to the location. Plans were to have it wired with a mercury switch that would trigger the device if any movement was detected. The group's intent was to eliminate any first responders distracted by the device. To purchase materials for the bombs, the group planned to murder a drug dealer and his family, and take his money.<sup>285</sup>

The ultimate goal of the attack, however, was not the energy plant, but rather obtaining enough money to finance a war. Taylor said he was watching a Loomis armored truck on its routes and claimed some unidentified Wise County Sheriff's deputies were part of the plan. Knowing that the armed guards working on the trucks were willing to defend themselves and their assets, the group

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<sup>284</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

planned to ambush the guards on their route. Taylor claimed the truck held over four million dollars, part of which would move all the co-conspirators to different locations. The remaining proceeds were for the purchase of weapons and explosives, because Taylor “was going after the government.”<sup>286</sup>

Even though Mitchell Energy was not the main objective of the operation, the group wanted to eliminate Wise County, despite knowing Taylor’s wife and daughter were there. The group was focused on going to war with the U.S. government and cared nothing of their potential victims whom they knew were innocent in the cause. Catherine Adams, a mother, pointed out a daycare facility about 50 yards outside the front fence. She told the group, “Well, there’s a daycare center over there. I hate to be that way, but if that’s the way it has to be, that’s the way it has to be.” The FBI arrested the four cell members and although Spence is somewhat bitter about how the arrest happened, he would not change his decisions because they saved lives.<sup>287</sup>

Some sources state the group intended to ignite a race war; however, Spence claims the ideology is not about race, but rather the U.S. government.<sup>288</sup> The KKK feels the government mistreats minorities by allowing them only the power the government wants them to wield. Although the KKK has a reputation of race-based hatred, Spence says they hate the federal government more. Historically, blacks have taken third place on the list of those the KKK dislikes, preceded by the federal government and Catholics at one time. Since Jews made a better target, they replaced Catholics on the list. An underlying fear of prosecution for activities considered hate crimes also exists. For this reason, leadership rarely speaks out condoning racial hatred even though they may have race-based prejudices, and minorities remain further down the list of those the KKK dislikes. The number one out-group or enemy on the list has not changed

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<sup>286</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns”; Southern Poverty Law Center, “Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City,” 9; Spence, interview.

since the formation of the KKK following the American Civil War. "It's got nothing to do with hatred. It's got to do with knowing who the enemy is. To the Klan, the enemy is the federal government, period."<sup>289</sup>

However, since the election of President Barak Obama, the country's first black president, Spence says the KKK's numbers have grown and the movement is stronger. He estimates present day KKK membership at around forty thousand. Interestingly, Spence addresses the typical estimated membership of five thousand touted throughout the literature. He claims watchdog organizations use the active recruiting members, who openly speak out at rallies and recruiting events, as the base line figure of approximately two thousand five hundred. Then, the watchdog groups determine if that many are visibly active; about the same number are likely active but not seen, leading to the estimated membership figure they provide of five to six thousand.<sup>290</sup> In reality, Spence claims, the membership numbers in Texas alone are at least that large, and he states the visible members are actually a very limited portion of the active Klan membership. To grow the membership, the KKK holds rallies and talks to the people. It passes out flyers and hands out literature explaining its views and the organization. While word of mouth recruiting has historically been the best way to spread the word, the KKK now has the Internet, which is a valuable recruiting tool. These visible members are the recruiters used for baseline numerical estimates. By far, however, the best recruiting tool is the membership. Having new and active members seek out their friends and family is the best way to increase the size of the organization.<sup>291</sup>

Despite the anti-government rhetoric, Spence says he strongly supports local law enforcement, and has done so openly at KKK rallies. He claims his personal views are not completely anti-government, and he sees local police as defenders of the family, which is a foundational belief for the Klan. While the

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<sup>289</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>290</sup> *Ku Klux Klan Rebounds*, 2.

<sup>291</sup> Spence, interview.



organization accepts law enforcement into their membership, those members are not privy to information that increases the Klavern's vulnerability. The Sheriff, however, is different. White supremacist adherents openly recognize the authority of the Sheriff, as they are officials elected by the people. Other law enforcement officers have no authority in the eyes of the movement. Personally, even though Spence openly supports local law enforcement in addition to the Sheriff, he admits he does not trust them. Only those individuals he knows individually and has a relationship with, even though they are officers, are trustworthy in his eyes.<sup>292</sup>

For counterterrorism efforts however, Spence feels the only viable options are undercover law enforcement infiltration of the KKK, or development of a confidential informant within the ranks of the organization. He advocates for the confidential informant method for the greatest chance of success. With this approach, Spence suggests targeting leadership for involvement. He claims it is more likely to be supportive of the family values and patriotism espoused by the Klan. Further, it is not normally involved in small cell operations and has no stake in the protection of the cell. Due to the fear of RICO, it has maintained its distance from trouble within the Klavern. The only way to accomplish this relationship is through honesty and support of the group ideology of family and country. Religion does not play a large part in the KKK ideology, but the members are proud of their love of country and kin, so law enforcement needs to use that to its advantage. Spence cautions all contact should be between only the officer and targeted individual to protect both parties, which includes not contacting an individual in front of the family.<sup>293</sup>

While not currently active in the KKK, Spence admits he maintains much of the same beliefs held by the organization. He does not entirely trust the federal government and experiences frustration at the terrorist label placed on those involved in the white power movement, most of whom are not violent despite

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<sup>292</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid.

media depictions to the contrary. Spence further admits he does not condone interracial and homosexual relationships. He has strong family values and love of country since he served in the U.S. Marine Corp. Spence agrees with the overarching ideology of the Klan, although not the violence from individual members, and has the following to say in defense of the movement.

To the majority of white supremacists, it's about family. It's about honor. It's about rights. It's about the federal government keeping their nose out of their business. It's about less taxation. It's about keeping foreigners out of this country. If you're black and want to join the NAACP, that's fine. But if you're white and you join the Klan, you're a terrorist. That's wrong.<sup>294</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Spence, interview.

## VI. CSA CASE STUDY

The history and events surrounding the CSA are widely publicized. It is not only in news stories and unclassified FBI documents, but also in the published works of Kerry Noble's, *Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City*, and retired FBI agent Danny O. Coulson's, *No Heroes: Inside the FBI's Secret Counter-Terror Force*. The CSA, led by James Dennis Ellison, was in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas.<sup>295</sup> Originally called "Zarephath," the group started as a religious commune to which individuals moved to raise their families in a close-knit community dedicated to worshipping the Lord.<sup>296</sup> In 1978, the group moved to a two hundred twenty-four acre property they purchased, which they called "Zarephath-Horeb Community Church."<sup>297</sup> Kerry and Kay Noble visited friends in the original "Zarephath" community in May 1977 for vacation, visitation, and the birth of their second child.<sup>298</sup> After bonding with Jim Ellison, the Nobles remained at the commune until its downfall.

During the evolution of the organization, Ellison took the group from one belief to another, based on religious ideology. When Noble arrived, Ellison preached the doctrines of "Sonship" and "Five-Fold Ministry," which Noble believed were false doctrines based on his religious education.<sup>299</sup> "Sonship" teaches that Jesus is the "Head of the Christ Body" and other people comprise the body, all of whom will ascend to Heaven in the same state of perfection as Jesus.<sup>300</sup> The doctrine of "Sonship" thus states the people composing the mortal

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<sup>295</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 29, 25.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, 25, 29; "Highway to Hate," *Dangerous Persuasions*, season 1, episode 5, aired February 13, 2013, produced by Ron Simon, Louise Norman, and Michael Kot (Silver Spring, MD), DVD.

<sup>299</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 33–34.

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*

body of Christ are sons as well, and incapable of sin.<sup>301</sup> The doctrine of “Five-Fold Ministry” stated that apostles and prophets continued to exist in the modern church and were necessary “for the perfecting of the saints into sonship.”<sup>302</sup> Despite his concerns about Ellison’s teachings, Noble bonded with the charismatic leader and committed himself to the man whose teachings he disagreed with, but who allowed and encouraged Noble to express his own beliefs in differing doctrines.<sup>303</sup> This kinship allowed Ellison to take his followers down an even darker path in the years to come.

Ellison encouraged Noble to hear Same Fife preach in Lubbock, Texas.<sup>304</sup> When he did, Fife pointed out Bible verses explaining “Sonship” and preached on the meaning of the belief, which allowed Noble to embrace the teaching.<sup>305</sup> Noble no longer openly disagreed with Ellison’s teachings, and he became more drawn to the leader and eager to learn more from him.<sup>306</sup> The bond between the two men deepened and their Zarephath-Horeb Community Church grew as well.<sup>307</sup> It was at this location that the followers believed Christians would find a place of respite safe from the government when the time of judgment arrived, which Ellison felt was drawing near.<sup>308</sup> To protect the community, the residents destroyed links to their pasts, such as photographs, and sold personal valuables to raise funds for the purchase of weapons, which they found empowering.<sup>309</sup> Lack of exposure to outside influences in the form of radio, television, and newspapers was also the new norm within the community.<sup>310</sup> This lack gave

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<sup>301</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 34.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., 45; “Highway to Hate,” *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>304</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 55.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid., 55–56.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 62, 66.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid., 60, 67.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 68; “Highway to Hate,” *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>310</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 68.

Ellison even greater power in that he now controlled all messages his followers received, rather than only their religious education. The group increasingly focused on the protection of Christians, spent \$52,000 on weapons, ammunition, and equipment between August 1978 and December 1979.<sup>311</sup> These purchases allowed it to train and morph into “Christian survivalists” as it prepared to be the saviors of American Christians.<sup>312</sup> The Christian commune became the base of operations for a patriot militia group founded in religious ideology, which operated under the control of “General” Ellison.<sup>313</sup> According to Noble, the three things necessary for the creation of an extremist group were driving the Zarephath-Horeb Community, including an ideology built upon false premises of despair and the coming judgment, the manipulation of a charismatic leader, and isolation from the outside world.<sup>314</sup>

As the group prepared for the anticipated downfall of American civilization, Ellison introduced them to the teachings of Pastor Dan Gayman, a principal advocate of and author on Christian Identity theology, which adheres to the belief that Anglo Saxons are the true Israel.<sup>315</sup> The seed-line doctrine of the Christian Identity religion teaches that true Israel descends from the union between Adam and Eve, while the Jews descend from the union of Eve and the Devil.<sup>316</sup> Ellison preached the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), led by the Jews, had declared war on white America, and trampled the values espoused in America’s founding documents, the Declaration of Independence, and the U.S. Constitution.<sup>317</sup> In 1979, Ellison inspired the group with the patriotic message, its purpose changed, and it, encouraged by Ellison, succumbed to the seductive

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<sup>311</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 73.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.; “Highway to Hate,” *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>313</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 73.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid., 85–86, 88–89; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 124–125.

<sup>316</sup> Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 45; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 88.

<sup>317</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 87.

poison of Christian Identity theology.<sup>318</sup> According to Noble, “The enemy’s face now began to take shape...Now we were no longer just Christian Survivalists, we were white supremacists!”<sup>319</sup>

In his book, *Tabernacle of Hate*, Noble aptly, although unknowingly, explains the seduction of the now cult-like organization within the framework of SIT.

A person’s mind is controlled once his identity, beliefs, behavior, thinking and emotions are replaced with a new identity. This new identity is the one which the original would strongly object to, if it knew in advance what was in store. For the core members of the group, if Zarephath had been in 1977 like it was in 1980, none of us would have moved there.<sup>320</sup>

In 1981, this new group identity enabled the organization to leave behind the Zarephath-Horeb Community Church, and become the CSA.<sup>321</sup> According to Ellison, the name better described the covenant between the group and God that they would act as the strong arm of the Lord to bring justice and judgment to America.<sup>322</sup> Not only did the military training continue, but the group also hosted the CSA National Convocation, with the goal in mind of uniting right-wing extremist organizations from around the country into one unified group, led by Ellison.<sup>323</sup>

In 1983, Ellison declared he had been found to be “perfect and that God had made him king” and took to calling himself, “King James of the Ozarks.”<sup>324</sup> Add to the leader’s inflated self-view the death of Identity adherent and tax protestor Gordon Kahl, seen by many on the far right as a martyr, and the time

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<sup>318</sup> “Highway to Hate,” *Dangerous Persuasions*; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 91.

<sup>319</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 89.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, 94–95.

<sup>321</sup> “Highway to Hate,” *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>322</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 100.

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*, 109, 111.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, 127, 157.

for war was at hand.<sup>325</sup> Ellison had continually predicted the beginning of the war, which had yet to come, and to save face with his followers, Ellison had to start the war.<sup>326</sup> Kahl's death in Arkansas served as the battle cry for the far right, and offered Ellison the opportunity he needed to protect his reputation.<sup>327</sup> Several failed plans later, desperate to secure his place in Ellison's "kingdom" and elevate himself in the leader's eyes, Noble volunteered to start the war himself.<sup>328</sup> Noble's path toward what would have been the largest act of domestic terrorism in the United States up to that time had begun.<sup>329</sup>

On June 23, 1984, Noble originally planned to shoot and kill as many as possible at a park in Kansas City, Missouri, known as a meeting spot for homosexual activity, and bomb an adult bookstore using a briefcase full of C-4 explosives and dynamite.<sup>330</sup> Neither plan worked. Noble and his associate changed targets to the Metropolitan Community Church, which was a gay church in Kansas City.<sup>331</sup> On the morning of Sunday, June 24, 1984, the two went to the church expecting to find a scene of debauchery and sat with the bomb placed under the pew beneath them.<sup>332</sup> While waiting to set the timer for detonation, Noble had the opportunity to contemplate the people around him and the potential consequences of his actions.<sup>333</sup> Seeing people that looked no different, displaying an honest expression of reaching out to God, Noble realized they likely had the same struggles and similarly asked God to relieve the inner turmoil of not having a place in society, with which he identified.<sup>334</sup> At that moment,

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<sup>325</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 130–131.

<sup>326</sup> "Highway to Hate," *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>327</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 133.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, 145; "Highway to Hate," *Dangerous Persuasions*."

<sup>329</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 146.

<sup>330</sup> "Highway to Hate," *Dangerous Persuasions*; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 145–146.

<sup>331</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 146.

<sup>332</sup> "Highway to Hate," *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 146–147.

<sup>334</sup> "Highway to Hate," *Dangerous Persuasions*.

Noble stated, “For me it was over. All I wanted to do was hold Kay.”<sup>335</sup> Noble told his associate they were done, picked up the bomb, and the two left the church to return to Ellison.<sup>336</sup>

Ellison was upset, as he believed Noble’s successful attack would have cemented Ellison’s reputation with not only his followers but with the nobility of the far right as well.<sup>337</sup> In addition, this attack would have secured Ellison’s reputation with the CSA National Convocation, which attracted right-wing groups and leaders from across the country. The group associated with convicted murderer Richard Wayne Snell and harbored members of the Order, also known as Bruders Schweigen, a right-wing terrorist organization that committed crimes to finance a war against the United States.<sup>338</sup> During this time, Ellison became involved in a dispute with the government over CSA property and the group embraced the sovereign citizen rhetoric of common law and paper terrorism tactics.<sup>339</sup> The group successfully protected the property and Ellison reached hero status within the organization.<sup>340</sup>

In the early morning hours of April 19, 1985, the FBI’s elite Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), led by Agent Danny O. Coulson, surrounded the CSA compound to serve federal warrants for the arrest of Ellison and a search of the compound.<sup>341</sup> At the time, April 19, Patriot’s Day, meant little, but is now an important date in the world of the far right following the siege on the Branch Davidian compound outside Waco, Texas, the execution of white supremacist Richard Wayne Snell in Arkansas, and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah

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<sup>335</sup> “Highway to Hate,” *Dangerous Persuasions*.

<sup>336</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 147.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*, 147–148.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 111, 148, 155–156.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, 150–154.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>341</sup> Danny O. Coulson and Elaine Shannon, *No Heroes: A Memoir of Coming Home* (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1999), 254, 195.



Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.<sup>342</sup> The CSA standoff lasted four days and on Monday, April 22, 1985, James Ellison and his followers surrendered to federal authorities.<sup>343</sup> The FBI spent several days searching the property and questioning the residents before arresting Noble on Friday, May 31, 1985, for weapons violations.<sup>344</sup>

On September 4, 1985, Noble was sentenced to five years in federal prison for conspiracy to possess unregistered weapons.<sup>345</sup> Noble served his sentence in several facilities, and was paroled on Friday, July 31, 1987, after refusing admittance into the Witness Protection/Relocation Program.<sup>346</sup> After years of odd jobs and writing his memoir, Noble has spent the time since his release educating others and striving to prevent them from taking the path of hate and violence he travelled.<sup>347</sup>

All information that follows is Noble's personal account of his involvement in the CSA, and his actions at the Metropolitan Community Church in Kansas City, Missouri, as related by Noble in an interview with the researcher on Wednesday, August 14, 2013, at his home.

Kerry and Kay Noble visited the community and loved the location and people. They opted to remain with their friends and the chance to be part of a communal living arrangement, that in the beginning was pacifist and Christian oriented. Guns and racism were not part of the community they joined. In the beginning, they loved enjoying the fellowship of others with a common goal. Noble said that with community living, the normal walls individuals build around themselves naturally surround the group instead. "You become self-identified

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<sup>342</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 9; Coulson and Shannon, *No Heroes*, 254.

<sup>343</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 171.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, 172–175.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*, 181–182.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

with each other, with the group.” “You’ve taken how you would be with society and transferred that to the collective.” The group grows together and reaches a point at which it feels it would “die” to protect one another.<sup>348</sup>

People join these organizations for a variety of reasons. Some have nothing else, but most have an internal desire to join with others. As society focuses more on individual accomplishments in some people, a greater need to be part of a community develops. “Most people just want something real.” “Really the root of it is people just want to belong to something that is bigger than themselves.” Community living pulls the group together even more than regular associations experienced by many groups in society. One problem with communal living is the joining of assets, which is a “trap within itself.” It can work, but the entire group needs to reach an agreement together on joining assets, and if so, how. CSA failed in this respect and did not take advantage of individual talents within the organization, nor did it provide individuals compensation for their labor.<sup>349</sup>

Growing the membership differs with each group. For instance, some advertise in publications with similar interests. Some recruit and others reach out to friends and acquaintances the group may interest. Some groups target attractions at which people with similar interests gather, but not all groups recruit because some want to remain small. Largely with religious groups, they feel God will handle whether the group expands or not.<sup>350</sup>

A combination of a small community isolated from society, and residents with no discretionary funds for family, isolated the group even more. With religious organizations like the CSA, societal norms are also taboo. In other words, family activities outside the community were unacceptable regardless of the lack of money within an individual family. Since families had no extra money

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<sup>348</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

and the local customs were taboo, fewer and fewer individual liberties existed within the group. Religion was the focus, and the CSA embraced Christian Identity theology.<sup>351</sup>

In retrospect, Noble states, “It’s a joke,” when asked about Christian Identity. He wonders, “How could we believe that?” Consider also, not only was the CSA an isolated community, no Internet was available nor was exposure to outside ideas for the members. In addition, the religion was deceptive enough that it allowed them to discuss things they already believed, and they relied on different scriptures to explain things they struggled to understand, which added to what they already believed and naturally became an addition to their core beliefs. Identity answered enough questions to support its validity. Noble now questions how people continue to practice Identity with research available to refute the core beliefs. Perhaps, it is not that people truly believe the message, but rather it validates their actions. Although the Nobles miss the community and remain devout Christians, they now find organized religion too confining. “People are hungry for answers.” However, “organized religion is...typically one man telling everybody else what to believe.” Noble ponders that maybe the lack of thought and communication is based on fear or ignorance.<sup>352</sup>

Although no longer his belief, during his time with the CSA, Noble did believe in a religious justification for race relations. Specifically, he “believed the white race was the only race that came from Adam and Eve.” “The other races were either mixed or pre-Adamic.” This belief was not a real problem for Noble, despite having had black friends prior to joining the CSA. He did not object to the seed line teachings of Identity either. Noble did struggle with seeing his former black friends as merely servants and slaves, but he had “never known any Jews, so it was easy to stereotype them.” Theologically Noble understood Identity enough to accept the dynamics of race relations with little internal conflict. Initially, the group refuted Identity as a theology based solely on hate, but after

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<sup>351</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

meeting Dan Gayman, and looking at Identity from a political perspective, the group embraced the theology because they loved America, considered themselves patriotic, and saw those traits as central to Identity. When reflecting on his journey, Noble stated, “It took me two years to learn to hate and separate races. It took me nine years to unlearn to hate and to put the races back together.”<sup>353</sup>

The introduction of Identity was not the beginning of the evolution to violence, however. Since the group was apocalyptic in nature, it believed the latter days of man were approaching, and believed in the idea of a one-world government and the antichrist as part of the end times. The CSA also believed that all people would endure the trials of the latter days, rather than only non-Christians. It was their duty to protect themselves and other Christian patriots during the end times. In 1978, through the teachings of John Todd, the CSA decided they needed guns to protect themselves, where before they believed God would protect them. Todd's teachings resonated with the group, who felt guns made sense from a purely defensive standpoint. Although the group was converting weapons and making hand grenades, they had these items as part of an arsenal that allowed them to defend themselves in the event of an attack. The death of Gordon Kahl changed all that.<sup>354</sup>

When Gordon Kahl died in Arkansas, in the CSA's backyard, its “territory,” the group advanced strongly “into the right wing movement in terms of taking action.” It was now willing to use its weapons in an offensive manner because of the “perception...the government had made war on the Christian patriot movement.” The right considered the deaths of Gordon Kahl and Robert Matthews of the Order, as the government telling the world the right wing was a threat it was intent on addressing. Unbeknownst to the government at the time,

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<sup>353</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

the death of Kahl was a battle cry for the right-wing movement, and the CSA began making plans because it became its “duty” to protect others by taking offensive action.<sup>355</sup>

Continually thwarted in their plans, the CSA decided God was not supportive of its pursuits. During that time, Noble was arguing with Jim Ellison over his place in Ellison’s kingdom and, desperate to prove himself to Ellison, offered to prove himself through action. According to Noble, it was his insecurities, fears, and feelings of not being worthy of Ellison that made him volunteer to take offensive action. Although not the original target, Noble and his associate walked into a gay church with a bomb, intending to set it. They felt God wanted them there and, based on the stereotype of gays in their minds, expected to find a scene of debauchery when they entered. They did not, but when the pastor spoke of his homosexual relationship, Noble confirmed it as their intended target. Homosexuality epitomized what the CSA stood against and viewed gays as enemies.<sup>356</sup>

Noble and his associate sat in the services for the first 10 minutes ready to act, but knew they had to wait before leaving so they would not arouse suspicion. During the wait, Noble had time to look around and think, which he was not supposed to do. His thoughts struck him.

They look like me. They’re no different than me except, you know, who they’re sitting next to. Why am I really here? Is this really going to start the so-called, Second American Revolution, or not? People are going to die. The people across the street are not involved and will die. I may die. I may get caught. God is offering no guarantees. Do I want to be known as a mass killer?<sup>357</sup>

As his thoughts raced, Noble had doubts and questions about what he was about to do. The music began and people lifted their hands in prayer. Noble then realized, “They are no different than us.” He saw them lost and searching for

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<sup>355</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

their way through God as they struggled to fit in with society, “questioning probably their own identity.” Noble contemplated his intended victims, and everything changed.

Their struggles automatically identified with my struggles and I'm identifying with theirs. Then all of a sudden they become me, and they become Christians, and there is no way I can justify killing Christians. They ceased to be homosexuals at that point. Once I saw they weren't evil, they weren't an enemy, then none of the other stuff mattered anymore.<sup>358</sup>

After his 30 minutes inside the church, Noble questioned things again, but did not yet leave the CSA. He realized he was at the point at which he accepted what Ellison taught without question, but he had lacked the confidence during that time to question Ellison and stand up to him. Noble's experience at the church changed everything for him and he was no longer arguing only with Ellison, but felt himself arguing with God. He wanted out, but God told him to stay. Noble said, in the end, God was right to make him stay and he believes the FBI siege would have ended differently without his presence. He was the stabilizing factor for the group and the only one who could have negotiated with the government. Without Noble, with the members of the Order present, and with the arsenal inside the compound, Ellison would have chosen to fight.<sup>359</sup>

Noble has taken advantage of the years since his involvement to reflect and consider potential efforts to counter violent extremism. He suggested looking first for that individual who, like him, is the stabilizing factor within the group who could be the one who writes the newsletter, but also consider the backgrounds of the individuals within the group, such as educational history and family, religious, or political backgrounds. These things can direct counterterrorism experts to those most susceptible to talking. The older generation is less likely to dialogue because they have more to lose. These members, especially the group leaders, are involved for the power and prestige and they have too much invested to

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<sup>358</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

support change. The younger members may not have positions of authority yet and their self-interest is not as strong. While the head of the organization “has too much invested to think outside his box,” sometimes people in leadership positions are approachable, as in the stabilizing factor above. Many times, these people may not be the top man, but they may have enough influence to assist with counterterrorism efforts, or at the very least, fragment the organization.<sup>360</sup>

Noble feels “balanced-power” methods may work.<sup>361</sup> The method has been successful when applied to Islamist extremism, and the same things that lead one individual to an Islamist group, a left wing group, or the IRA, lead people to white supremacy. Every portion of society needs a seat at the table for a whole community effort if the model stands a chance of success to include churches, the media, the educational system, local government, law enforcement, especially the sheriff, and any group in society that can help offer alternatives and exposure to differing viewpoints. The key is to include every aspect of society possible to increase the groups’ exposure and “lessen the fears of the enemy.” “Everything in the movement is based upon fear.” When individual’s fear becomes so strong, they see no alternatives, they embrace violent extremism. Until that time, they may have extremist beliefs, but no desire to act on them and little threat exists. When they see no hope for change, extremist violence is more attractive. They experience pressure from above placed on them by the leadership and pressure from below placed on them by personal obligations, internal pressures, and fear. The individual either leaves, or breaks at this point. Society counters pressure from above when churches, schools, and law enforcement, filter in truth. Changes in the individual’s living conditions are necessary to counter pressure from below, or the personal obligations. When

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<sup>360</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>361</sup> Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 19.

people see positive change in their personal situation, it alters their self-image, and counters pressures from above and below because it gives them hope for the future.<sup>362</sup>

The solutions are not complicated, but they require society to talk about race and be open to change for the community, which means the kind of change the community truly wants, rather than the change the local government sees as best. It requires an understanding of the group's ideology, and for religious groups, their theology. It requires an understanding of the group dynamics of those involved. It requires stressing the importance of commonalities rather than focusing on differences. It requires acknowledgement that even though people's views may differ, they are similar, which should be the emphasis of any program. It requires an appeal to their patriotism and family values. It requires drawing on their internal motivations and redirecting them to productive pursuits, which is stronger even than any dialogue. The most important requirement is to provide alternatives, which breaks down the "us" versus "them" mindset. Incorporate the group into society rather than further alienating them.<sup>363</sup>

Based on his experiences, Noble offers the following advice on counterterrorism efforts.

Engage the group. Get away from this us versus them mentality because it doesn't work. Going against something doesn't work. You do the opposite of what they expect you to do, which is what Coulson did for us. You'll become more effective. Speaking out against them gives them the reaction they want, and they win. If, on the other hand...you open up...some sort of collaborative communication, you might just get somewhere. That's what's needed. Don't feed us versus them. Do what they don't expect you to do. It's simple to get people in these groups to think, but that doesn't make it easy.

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<sup>362</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.



## VII. OTHER APPROACHES

When considering approaches to counter white supremacist violent extremism, no reason exists to start from scratch. Other countries have successfully implemented counterterrorism strategies for years, whether aimed at domestic or international counterterrorism efforts. Strategies are also used within the United States to target other groups, like gangs, that are useful to examine. With any previously tried program or strategy, it is necessary to review not only the successes, but the failures as well. Without consideration of why and how a program failed, reimplementation of the strategy is likely to result in the same mistakes.

The United Kingdom has battled domestic terrorism for years and its Prevent strategy aimed at counterterrorism efforts within the Muslim population bear examination. In the United States, gang intervention has seen success for years as well. Both programs have strengths and weaknesses, but both have seen success. While not aimed at white supremacist organizations, they could work for that purpose. Using a program aimed at intervention or counterterrorism, with modifications for a specific group ideology and structure, could be successful for countering white supremacist violent extremism. Not only could a program be modified to target a different type of group, it can also be modified to target a group specific to local circumstances, which is the heart of research done by Brad Deardorff in his work, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*.

### A. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S APPROACH

The United Kingdom has a long history of responding to acts of terrorism, including the Troubles and Islamist terrorism. In the Troubles, the United Kingdom battled domestic terrorism from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).<sup>364</sup> In response to the PIRA, the UK's

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<sup>364</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 35–38.

government adopted a soft power approach and the tactic led to negotiation.<sup>365</sup> The cooperation of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) with the people, and the desire to address their legitimate grievances, led to the successful implementation of soft power tactics.<sup>366</sup> By its demonstrated interest in resolving the Troubles and the resulting violence, the government gained credibility with the public.<sup>367</sup> This atmosphere led to the government and community working together to find a successful resolution to the violence.<sup>368</sup>

The approach during the Troubles proved successful, and the United Kingdom attempted to address Islamist terrorism following 9/11 in a similar fashion by embracing the Prevent strategy, which is part of the UK's CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. CONTEST is a "balanced approach that incorporates both hard and soft power: aggressive military action and policing to disrupt terrorist operations paired with engagement strategies designed to stop the flow of new recruits and cut off support for terrorist organizations."<sup>369</sup> The Prevent component of CONTEST relies on the expectation that community involvement in the prevention of terrorism is vital and expected.<sup>370</sup> This active involvement addresses five main areas of concern for counterterrorism strategists, which include the following.

- Challenging violent extremist ideology
- Disrupting the promotion of violent extremism
- Individual support of recruits or those undergoing radicalization
- Increased community resilience against violent extremism
- Addressing legitimate grievances of the individual ideologies<sup>371</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 42.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid., 46–47.

An important component of the Prevent strategy is the soft power approach, which proved successful during the Troubles. With the soft power component, the government entity works in conjunction with the community to counter radicalization. The driving idea behind soft power is that government will overlook petty criminal offenses in return for willing community leaders to intervene with the radicalization process and work to counter the violent extremist narrative.<sup>372</sup> Government can always come back and address these minor offenses at a later time should the counter radicalization efforts prove unsuccessful, which leads to the hard power approach in a balanced power effort.<sup>373</sup> As with the soft power approach during the Troubles, the community is allowed to develop a level of trust for HMG necessary for long-term collaboration related to counterterrorism efforts.

In the United Kingdom, a strong community-policing model builds bridges with the community, develops trust, and opens lines of communication.<sup>374</sup> In addition, the United Kingdom embraces the participation of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to assist the community in increasing resiliency against the violent extremist narrative.<sup>375</sup> The Channel program addresses individual recruits or those undergoing the radicalization process. The program uses a channel coordinator and panel of members who determine the best method of countering the narrative for each specific individual.<sup>376</sup> Another important aspect of the UK Prevent strategy is local jurisdictions develop approaches individually, rather than an overarching policy coming from one central governmental agency.<sup>377</sup> This strategy allows for differences in narratives and approaches specific for individual geographic locations. This component is vital because no one size fits all

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<sup>372</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 47.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid.

<sup>374</sup> Ibid.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid., 51.

approach exists for any policy. What works in one location or for one group, may not be successful when applied in different locations or with different groups espousing different ideologies.

Not to imply that white supremacist organizations have legitimate grievances, as with the PIRA, but the Prevent strategy serves as a basis for the development of a successful design to counter violent extremism from other groups. The UK has been criticized for how it pursued the Prevent strategy, which requires consideration to prevent repeating the mistakes. While Prevent appears logical, and likely successful, based on past strategies during the Troubles, these criticisms deserve consideration. To begin, prior to the 7/7 London bombings, Prevent was active and engaging with the community to combat violent extremism. The central thought throughout the process, however, remained on the possibility of foreign threats, as opposed to the domestic terrorist acts experienced during the height of the Troubles.<sup>378</sup> Everything changed after 7/7 when the United Kingdom realized it faced a threat from within it never imagined. Differing perspectives on how to proceed with the Prevent strategy arose, but all included community involvement. The initial stage included HMG publicly reaching out to prominent community leaders to participate in a mandatory task force to combat violent extremism.<sup>379</sup> The task force, called Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups (PET), included seven working groups comprised of more than 100 individuals discussing and recommending things government and the community should address.<sup>380</sup> PET focused on the following items: engaging young people, education, engaging Muslim women, supporting regional and local initiatives, Imams' training and accreditation, the role of mosques in the community, community security, increasing confidence in

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<sup>378</sup> Hellyer, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, 17.

<sup>379</sup> Ibid.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 18.

policing, and addressing extremism and radicalization.<sup>381</sup> In furtherance of the Prevent strategy, the community addresses violent extremism and radicalization, while the government only acts when needed.<sup>382</sup>

Problems occurred in the beginning, which started with the members selected to participate in the working groups. Many had little or no record of accomplishment of community involvement. Many were lobbyists or tied to a particular political agenda. Few were independent and many lacked the expertise to decide on the issues at hand. It appeared a handful of government officials selected the working group membership from within their own spheres of influence. The groups met only three times and the members had to volunteer personal time to participate.<sup>383</sup>

PET submitted recommendations for improvements following the 7/7 attacks, but the government rejected them. The community saw this as evidence that PET was little more than a publicity stunt with no power to address, and surely no ability to prevent, violent extremism. In addition, rather than creating community cohesion, PET had the opposite effect. Communities, instead of working with the government to develop solutions, began depending on government intervention to address concerns. Recall that community involvement is necessary for a successful Prevent strategy.<sup>384</sup>

With the downfall of PET, HMG took the approach of using a speaking tour of scholars teaching mainstream Islamic ideals. HMG also created the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) for improving mosques and related organizations.<sup>385</sup> MINAB includes representatives from all sectors of

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<sup>381</sup> Hellyer, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, 18.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., 18–19.

<sup>384</sup> Ibid., 19–20.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid., 20.

Islam and remains in existence today.<sup>386</sup> HMG also provided funds to NGOs working to counter violent extremism within the community, which led to the Prevent strategy.<sup>387</sup> Another concern developed from the selection process of the NGOs the government funded, which was the unintended labeling of the Muslim community as either good or bad depending on its participation in a particular sector of Islam and the participation of that group within the Prevent strategy.<sup>388</sup> Added to this image was that of the “ex-Islamist” as former radical Islamist adherents surfaced to help counter the violent extremist narrative.<sup>389</sup> The individuals, heavily covered by the media, appeared closely associated with right-wing adherents and government organizations, which led to the failure of the greater Muslim community to support their efforts.<sup>390</sup> Unfortunately, these individuals had valuable information to contribute, but the Muslim community was unaccepting because of its openly expressed political agendas and government funding.<sup>391</sup>

In 2012, a House of Commons Select Committee review of the Prevent strategy determined the following issues affected its implementation.

- The strategy was not clear and the lack of a clear and consistent engagement strategy led to Prevent appearing arbitrary.
- The government funding of programs dictated how Muslim society operated. Those programs that received government funding had no clear direction or mission for action.
- The crossover of community and security concerns led to both agendas blurring, and a stigmatization of an entire segment of the population. A community engagement program that does not win over the people is doomed to fail.

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<sup>386</sup> Hellyer, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, 20.

<sup>387</sup> Ibid.

<sup>388</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid., 25.

- A culture of “gate-keepers” emerged with the close alliance of select cliques of government officials and individuals closely aligned with them acting as community representatives.
- The program disrupted the Muslim community when it devolved into a program identifying good and bad Muslims, which led to a dividing line between us and them, the community and the government.
- With the serious flaws listed above, the program developed a reputation of being nothing more than an elaborate government surveillance program.<sup>392</sup>

While Prevent has seen its share of criticism, the idea behind the strategy has validity, but H. A. Hellyer makes the following suggestions for Prevent to work in the future.

- Community cohesion must remain disengaged from counterterrorism.
- The government must actively participate with those with which it may not agree.
- It is imperative the government is willing to work with anyone who renounces violence.
- All sections of the community must be involved and have a place at the table during discussions.
- Government cannot interfere with theology.
- Focus on restricting funding to hard power actions.<sup>393</sup>

Government must understand extremism is not illegal, and accept the goal is to prevent violence. Further, all stakeholders must be engaged to see Prevent be successful in countering violent extremism.

## **B. APPROACHES FOR THE UNITED STATES**

Robert Deardorff, based on his research, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” and *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, suggested restructuring and processes to counter violent extremism as it relates to Islamism, using a “balanced-power”

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<sup>392</sup> Hellyer, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, 26–28.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, 42–43.

approach, based on those from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.<sup>394</sup> In the United States, Deardorff suggests using the community to notify law enforcement when it believes an individual is susceptible or undergoing the process of radicalization. Moderate clerical leaders within the Muslim community can then step in to counsel the individual and intervene. An open and transparent relationship with the Muslim community can help improve its comfort levels when hard power is necessary, such as the active involvement of law enforcement to interrupt a suspected terrorist plot. Further, this relationship of trust can lead the community to come forward with possible radicalization within its midst to allow law enforcement and religious leaders to intervene.<sup>395</sup> Deardorff suggests the creation of ROC Centers to accomplish the coordination of an overarching national counterterrorism approach tailored to local level requirements.<sup>396</sup> Deardorff advocates a community policing approach to counterterrorism efforts, similar to anti-gang initiatives practiced by many law enforcement agencies for years.<sup>397</sup>

White supremacist organizations operate clandestinely and the individuals most aware of suspicious circumstances, and indicators of potential extremist violence, are those already within the in-group, or former members of the in-group. Those individuals are the mostly likely to have the insight to interrupt potential violent extremism, and are those with whom open dialogue is most beneficial in the end. In addition, they are the individuals most likely to have credibility with someone during the soft power stage of engagement. At some point, however, someone in the community or educational system noticed a change in these individuals, and to reach the point of engaging the leadership, it

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<sup>394</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 19; Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 181–185, 209.

<sup>395</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 98–103, 110–111, 114–116, 119–123.

<sup>396</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 220.

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.



is necessary to begin with the community. This approach has proven effective in gang intervention according to research by Kimberly Tobin, which she details in her work, *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective*.

Tobin suggests a three-pronged approach to gang intervention including targeting at risk populations, high-risk youths, and redirection efforts.<sup>398</sup> In the primary targeting of at risk populations, educational efforts target the entire population.<sup>399</sup> With high-risk youths, the aim is to prevent them from joining gangs and those individuals, already exposed to gang life, are the primary targets for education and intervention at this stage.<sup>400</sup> For the third level of prevention, the target is those already involved in gangs and the goal is to prevent gang members from continued membership within their respective groups.<sup>401</sup> For successful implementation of this three-pronged approach, Tobin suggests the application of the Sperger Model as the prevention framework.<sup>402</sup>

The Sperger Model was determined an effective method during a five-year study in Chicago, Illinois.<sup>403</sup> The Chicago Police Department, however, failed to commit fully to the program, which resulted in community ambivalence for continuation.<sup>404</sup> The Sperger Model incorporates the following elements: community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provisions, suppression, and organizational change.<sup>405</sup> Community mobilization, based on social disorganization theory, aims to strengthen ineffective communities by fostering cooperation among social services agencies.<sup>406</sup> Social intervention,

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<sup>398</sup> Kimberly Tobin, *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective*, 1st ed. (Prentice Hall, 2007), 148–149.

<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*

based on theories addressing individual risks, including family dynamics and psychological problems, aims to correct these deficiencies.<sup>407</sup> Opportunities provisions, based on underclass theory, aims to provide opportunities for education and employment advancement not available in the community.<sup>408</sup> Suppression, based on deterrence, aims to increase consequences for gang membership, as involvement is an individual choice.<sup>409</sup> Law enforcement tends to embrace suppression as an intervention policy, which is not successful alone.<sup>410</sup> Organizational change relies on the use of the judicial system as an effective policy for the suppression of gang related behavior.<sup>411</sup>

The premise behind the Sperger Model is that true intervention requires a comprehensive multi-pronged approach that addresses the individual, in conjunction with the community, law enforcement, and the judicial system.<sup>412</sup> None of the methods finds success when used alone, but together, are successful in gang intervention. The Sperger Model also allows modification to reflect the individual community involved, along with the particulars of the gang involvement within that community, because no one size fits all approach for prevention exists.<sup>413</sup> It is necessary to modify the five target areas to fit the geographical location, the community composition, the type of organization, and regional beliefs and values.

While neither Deardorff's model, nor the Sperger Model for gang intervention, focuses on countering violent extremism from white supremacist organizations, both models serve as the building blocks for a potential design. That being the case, it is vital to consider both their strengths and weaknesses to

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<sup>407</sup> Tobin, *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective*, 151–152.

<sup>408</sup> *Ibid.*, 151, 153.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, 151, 154.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*, 150–159.

<sup>413</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

keep from repeating previous mistakes. Deardorff's work holds great potential to be applicable to all types of extremist organizations. It applies traditional community policing models, and changes the mindset of the law enforcement agency to one of terrorism prevention as opposed to community relations, which requires little to no political risk on the part of the agency, but is also unlikely to yield positive counterterrorism results.<sup>414</sup> His research advocates the implementation and action of a National Counterterrorism Strategy with funding attached, and tailored for local level requirements.<sup>415</sup> The framework of SIT used by Deardorff is the main component that increases the likelihood of applying it to organizations besides those espousing Salafi-jihadist narrative, which are the focus of his research.<sup>416</sup> The theory allows those involved in counterterrorism efforts to understand the motivations of the groups they seek to engage.<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 201.

<sup>415</sup> Ibid., 204, 219–221.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid., 198.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid., 186.

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## VIII. ANALYSIS

The researcher compared a KKK case study to a case study involving the CSA. The research subject in the KKK case study was Robert Leslie Spence, Jr., former Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, located in Texas.<sup>418</sup> The research subject in the CSA case study was Kerry Wayne Noble, former second in command of the CSA, located in Arkansas.<sup>419</sup> The researcher chose the former leaders based on their decisions to interrupt or abort a terrorist plot within their respective organizations.<sup>420</sup> Both cases detail a successful intervention that did not involve outside deterrence to prevent the specific domestic terror incident. This research compares the KKK case with the CSA case to determine if “balanced-power” may successfully counter violent extremism committed by white supremacist adherents.<sup>421</sup> The analysis sought to determine patterns and causal relationships relevant to countering violent extremism.

After collection, the researcher organized data obtained from the individual case studies in relation to the research questions. The researcher matched individual interview questions to specific research questions, as well as any additional data that emerged. As a theoretical framework, the researcher applied SIT to the specific research questions and additional emergent themes obtained during the interview process to allow for the categorization of similar themes and ideologies that emerged during the research process. The researcher also used specific quotes to assist in illustrating the individual themes that emerged related to the research questions.

The researcher coded the interview questions both individually, and related to the five research themes. For case comparison, the researcher created

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<sup>418</sup> Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.”

<sup>419</sup> Bishop, “Plot Against U.S. Described In Court.”

<sup>420</sup> Ibid.; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*; Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.”

<sup>421</sup> Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 19.

a Word table for each interview question, as well as for each research category.<sup>422</sup> This table allowed for determining cross-case similarities and patterns more easily. While the analytical method relies on the researcher's interpretation of the data, the method is analogous to cross-experiment interpretation methods using quantitative data.<sup>423</sup> The Word tables created for each interview question, and each research question, appear in the Appendix.

To refresh the reader, five questions were addressed in this research.

- Is it possible to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?
- Are there generational differences in leadership that effect interactions with the group?
- Does religion influence race relations?
- What induces participation in the group?
- Is "balanced-power" an effective foundation for a program to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?

Each research subject answered 14 questions related to the five research themes.

- How did you get involved with the organization?
- Why did you join?
- Why do others join?
- What do you see as the relationship between different races?
- Do you participate in organized religion?
- What are your thoughts on Christian Identity?
- How do you recruit new members?
- Is there a difference in leadership with different generations?
- What are your feelings toward law enforcement?
- Would you ever trust them?
- Does your organization condone violence?

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<sup>422</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods: 5 (Applied Social Research Methods)*, 4th edition (Sage Publications, Inc, 2008), 160.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

- Could a relationship be developed between your organization and law enforcement?
- Who would need to be involved?
- What approach would you suggest?

The research questions were as follows.

- Questions nine (9), ten (10), and eleven (11) related to theme one, the possibility of countering KKK violent extremism.
- Question eight (8) related to theme two, generational leadership differences.
- Questions four (4), five (5), and six (6) related to theme three, religious influence on race relations.
- Questions one (1), two (2), three (3), and seven (7) related the theme four, group participation.
- Questions twelve (12), thirteen (13), and fourteen (14), related to theme five, the possible effectiveness of “balanced-power.”

#### **A. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

Research question one addressed the possibility of countering violent extremism *from within* the KKK. The data revealed some unexpected similarities between the two organizations. A common anti-government theme emerged within the two very different groups. Both the KKK and the CSA recognized the County Sheriff as the only law enforcement entity with authority.<sup>424</sup> Posse Comitatus, which is Latin for “power of the county,” stems from medieval British law that allowed the Sheriff to summon members of the citizenry to quell insurrection and apprehend criminals.<sup>425</sup> Following reconstruction, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, restricted the U.S. military from enforcing laws within individual states, with the original intent of restricting troops from policing state elections held in former Confederate states.<sup>426</sup> Although exceptions occur to the Posse Comitatus Act, the right-wing movement embraces the original idea of

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<sup>424</sup> Noble, August 14, 2013; Robert Spence, September 5, 2013.

<sup>425</sup> Daniel Levitas, *The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right*, 1st. ed., November 2002 (St. Martin’s Griffin, 2004), 2.

<sup>426</sup> RAND, “Overview of Posse Comitatus Act,” (n.d.), [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf), 1–2,

Posse Comitatus as it relates to the Sheriff's authority.<sup>427</sup> Noble referenced Posse Comitatus when explaining the County Sheriff is the only ruling official.<sup>428</sup> Spence went further and explained, because the Sheriff is an elected official, the people grant his authority, and he is, therefore, the only authority recognized by the Klan.<sup>429</sup>

In addition to the anti-government rhetoric, both the KKK and the CSA wanted war with the U.S. government.<sup>430</sup> The KKK's desire to bomb the Mitchell Energy plant was part of an overall plan to finance a war with the government.<sup>431</sup> While the CSA's plan to bomb the Metropolitan Community Church was not to help finance the war, it was to start the war in response to the death of tax protestor Gordon Kahl.<sup>432</sup> Both subjects expressed personal views about concerns of government interference and faulty decision making.<sup>433</sup> In addition, both subjects expressed a strong sense of patriotism and love of country, which was common with both groups, along with the importance of family values.<sup>434</sup> These last two may seem to contradict the anti-government beliefs, but in fact, do not. Both groups see faulty government decision making as detrimental to the country they love and want to see it protected. They hold a strong positive identity related to their citizenship and membership in the American in-group. As they perceive the country challenged by the government, they must act to maintain their honor. For instance, when discussing the CSA's offensive reaction to Kahl's death, Noble stated the group's "perception was the government had made war on the Christian patriot movement."<sup>435</sup> He added, "Because of Kahl

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<sup>427</sup> RAND, "Overview of Posse Comitatus Act," 2–3; Levitas, *The Terrorist Next Door*, 2.

<sup>428</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>429</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid.; Noble, interview.

<sup>431</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>432</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>434</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>435</sup> Noble, interview.



being killed in Arkansas, it became our duty to become offensive we thought.”<sup>436</sup> The same holds true for the groups’ beliefs in family values and protection of the family unit. The family is, like their American identity, another in-group to which each person belongs and for which they fight to maintain a positive self-identity. Challenge of the family unit elicits a similar response, if not stronger, as a challenge to patriotism.

Interview question nine related to general feelings about law enforcement. The only common theme involved the Sheriff as the only official with authority.<sup>437</sup> Noble addressed Posse Comitatus as the determining influence and discussed the group’s concern of not targeting the Sheriff and deputies during the FBI siege at their compound, specifically due to their personal relationship that evolved over the years.<sup>438</sup> Spence discussed his personal support of local law enforcement, despite his organization’s disagreement.<sup>439</sup> In addition, the right-wing movement as a whole, only recognizes the authority of Sheriffs because they are elected by the people, adds Spence.<sup>440</sup>

Interview question ten related to trust of law enforcement. The only common theme involved the requirement of time to develop trust through personal relationships.<sup>441</sup> Spence explained that the KKK allows law enforcement into the organization as members, but they are not trusted with all Klavern information.<sup>442</sup> In addition, Spence stated that despite his support of local law enforcement, he only trusts those individuals he knows directly and with whom he has a personal relationship.<sup>443</sup> Noble explains the CSA developed trust with its local Sheriff and deputies over a period of years, which included the

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<sup>436</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>438</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>439</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>440</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>441</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>442</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>443</sup> Ibid.

officials visiting the CSA's compound and checking on the membership.<sup>444</sup> This trust encouraged open dialogue with the group over an extended time.<sup>445</sup>

Interview question eleven asked if the organizations condoned violence. No similar themes emerged in response to this question. Spence explained the Klan as a whole does not openly condone violence, including the leadership.<sup>446</sup> The individual members, however, may disagree and split off into the small cell structure advocated by fellow Klansman Louis Beam, known as "Leaderless Resistance."<sup>447</sup> This situation presents the greatest danger related to violence from within the organization. Interestingly, the significant reason the KKK and its leaders disavow violence is not because it is appropriate, but rather in fear of prosecution under RICO should they be associated with any violent extremist acts from its membership.<sup>448</sup> Noble, on the other hand, said the CSA evolved into a group that did condone, even perpetrate, acts of violence.<sup>449</sup> The group began as a pacifist organization, and over time, evolved into a Christian patriot organization willing to use violence in defense of fellow patriots.<sup>450</sup> The death of Gordon Kahl forced the group into the challenge-response mode detailed above. The group perceived his death as a challenge by the U.S. government and felt it was its duty to defend others, or rather, its honor. Failure to act would shame the CSA in the eyes of the right-wing movement. The CSA's response to the challenge was going to war with the government, which the church bombing was to begin.

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<sup>444</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

<sup>446</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid.

<sup>449</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid.

## **B. GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES AND INTERACTIONS**

Research question two related to generational differences in leadership that affect interactions with the group. No common themes emerged. Both subjects felt a difference in the generations existed, including how to possibly interacting with them. The viewpoints were completely different, however. Spence felt interactions with older leaders within the organization was a better option because they are more likely to do the “right” thing in relation to protecting innocents from violence perpetrated by the membership.<sup>451</sup> Further, the leaders’ extreme fear of RICO mean they are inclined to direct law enforcement to insiders involved in small cell operations.<sup>452</sup> Younger members of the KKK had an increased likelihood of involvement in the small cell operations aimed at committing acts of violence.<sup>453</sup>

From Noble’s perspective, the older leaders were less likely to cooperate in any manner with anyone.<sup>454</sup> They have more invested in the movement and more to lose, including the power and prestige desired by the “old guard.”<sup>455</sup> Younger members, however, have not yet achieved positions of authority and their self-interest is not at the same level as the older generation.<sup>456</sup> This situation makes them more likely to embrace interactions from outside the organization. While these leaders disagree on potential effective approaches to this issue, the differences may be attributed to differences in group identity, ideology, experiences, or personal direction within their specific organizations.

Interview question eight related to generational leadership differences and was the only question specifically related to the theme of interactions with the group based on generational differences. Again, no common themes and

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<sup>451</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid.

<sup>454</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>455</sup> Ibid.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid.

divergent viewpoints emerged. Spence stated KKK perpetrated more violence, which he attributed to the organization being less family oriented with younger generations, and the threat of lone wolf extremist violence, which is more likely to involve younger members.<sup>457</sup> Spence said, “Lone wolves are really the problem because there is no oversight for their actions.”<sup>458</sup> Noble again disagreed because older members were not supportive of outsiders.<sup>459</sup> The in-group/out-group dynamic is stronger with the older members, who have a pronounced “us versus them” mentality.<sup>460</sup> Leaders within the organization may hold sway with the group as a whole, but the head of the organization “has too much invested to be willing to think outside his box.”<sup>461</sup>

### C. RELIGION AND RACE RELATIONS

Research question three related to the influence of religion on race relations. The KKK has a history of anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and acting as protector of white Protestant America.<sup>462</sup> The CSA’s Christian Identity beliefs involved religious doctrine to explain race relations.<sup>463</sup> However, no common themes were related to religion and race relations with the two groups, as the views depended on the motivation of the particular group. For Spence’s KKK, the motivation behind views on race relations was entirely political and based on the Klan’s understanding the government manipulates minorities and only allows them the level of power the government desires.<sup>464</sup> Spence was also of the opinion that Identity promotes violence, and personally, felt violence based on

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<sup>457</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid.

<sup>459</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>460</sup> Ibid.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 33, 112–113; Spence, interview.

<sup>463</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 85–86, 88–89; Noble, interview; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 45, 124–125.

<sup>464</sup> Spence, interview.

race was unacceptable.<sup>465</sup> The CSA approached race relations from a strictly religious stance. Racial prejudice was theologically acceptable and the group believed minorities were pre-Adamic and the white race was the only race descended from the union of Adam and Eve.<sup>466</sup> Also, no minorities were allowed within the religious group from its inception, not because the CSA denied its association, but rather, because it did not attempt to join the commune.<sup>467</sup> The implication, according to Noble, is it is easier to stereotype individuals when no one has prior associations with others like them.<sup>468</sup> It is easier to place the “other” in the out-group when someone does not know anyone else like them.

Interview question four related to views regarding the relationship between races. Again, no common themes emerged as the groups’ views on race related to their motivation, whether political or religious. For the KKK, attitudes regarding race revolved around government involvement and the political aspects of race relations, especially related to hate crime accusations.<sup>469</sup> A strong underlying fear of potential future incidents labeled as hate crimes was based on the group openly expressing racial beliefs.<sup>470</sup> While Spence said he personally thinks individuals should not hate based on skin color, but rather respect people as individuals, he does admit he does not condone interracial relationships and blacks are on the Klan’s list of groups it dislikes.<sup>471</sup> For the CSA, views on race relations relied strictly on theology and specific biblical scriptures. Christian Identity is a white supremacist religion, which adheres to the belief that Anglo Saxons are the true Israel.<sup>472</sup> The CSA embraced the seed-line doctrine of the

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<sup>465</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>466</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>467</sup> Ibid.

<sup>468</sup> Ibid.

<sup>469</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>470</sup> Ibid.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid.

<sup>472</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 85–86, 88–89; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 124–125.

Christian Identity religion, which believes the true Israel descends from the union between Adam and Eve, while the Jews descend from the union of Eve and the Devil.<sup>473</sup> Noble, who no longer holds these beliefs, had little issue with them while a member of the CSA.<sup>474</sup>

Interview question five relates to the research subjects' involvement in organized religion. Again, no common themes emerged between the two. Spence is a lifelong Southern Baptist and he did not elaborate on the topic.<sup>475</sup> Noble feels organized religion is too confining and does not encourage independent thought.<sup>476</sup> It is nothing more than one person telling others what to believe, much like his time in the CSA.<sup>477</sup> Noble searched for a church upon his release from prison and currently attends a branch of the Unity church, but continues to long for Christian communal living, akin to the early time of the original "Zarephath" community, before its evolution into the CSA.<sup>478</sup>

Interview question six related to the subjects' thoughts on Christian Identity. The only commonality related to the potential violence of the Rebellious Christian Identity believers.<sup>479</sup> Spence referred to Christian identity adherents as "crazy" and to the CSA specifically as "nuts."<sup>480</sup> He was of the opinion believers thought their religion was only true religion and the beliefs, and believers, were violent.<sup>481</sup> Noble replied, "It's a joke."<sup>482</sup> He said the theology is deceptive and specific scriptural explanations serve to decrease the individual's internal

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<sup>473</sup> Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity," 45; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 88.

<sup>474</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>475</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>476</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid.; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 29.

<sup>479</sup> Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity," 39–40.

<sup>480</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

<sup>482</sup> Noble, interview.

struggles.<sup>483</sup> Like organized religion, Noble explained the group believed the theology based on the teachings of Ellison, its leader, and its isolation, which prevented exposure to alternative viewpoints.<sup>484</sup> In hindsight, Noble ponders if current adherents use Identity as an excuse for violent action rather than truly believing the doctrine.<sup>485</sup> He feels more exposure to dissenting data existed than was available during the height of the CSA.<sup>486</sup> Despite the availability of information rebuking the beliefs of adherents to Christina Identity, the in-group solidarity remains, as with the CSA, which has much to do with the potential for violence. The group must maintain a positive self-identity, and the negative identity of the out-group only serves to strengthen the in-group. As discussed earlier in the research, when collective reality becomes the norm within the group, the potential to base “defense” of the group on a violent ideology becomes acceptable.<sup>487</sup>

#### **D. GROUP PARTICIPATION**

Research question four related to the inducement to participate in these groups, and was the only research area in which numerous commonalities emerged. The differences that emerged related mainly to the motivation of the individual research subjects. Common themes with group involvement in the KKK and the CSA included family, belonging, personal relationships, and recruitment. For Spence, his participation in the Klan began with family ties and continued with the personal relationships he developed.<sup>488</sup> Others join the KKK for the family orientation and sense of belonging not only to a group, but to a family as well.<sup>489</sup> In addition, the most successful recruiting methods involve calling on

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<sup>483</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid.

<sup>485</sup> Ibid.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid.

<sup>487</sup> Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, 149, 182.

<sup>488</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>489</sup> Ibid.

those personal relationships, which include the individual member's friends.<sup>490</sup> For Noble, his participation in the CSA began with personal relationship with friends and the camaraderie of the communal living arrangements.<sup>491</sup> Others joined the CSA for the "family" gained by participation, in addition to an internal longing to belong to a group and something seen as a larger cause.<sup>492</sup> As with the KKK, the most successful recruiting methods involved calling on personal relationships with former friends and biological family.<sup>493</sup>

The data emerging from this research topic adheres to the theoretical framework of SIT very well. SIT is useful in explaining the importance of group dynamics and the central idea of SIT is the individual desire to establish a distinct identity, which affects a person in a positive way.<sup>494</sup> No benefit exists for individuals to establish identities that make them feel bad about themselves, or reflect themselves in a negative light. SIT suggests that individuals, in search of this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to join a group that will fulfill their emotional needs.<sup>495</sup> The group will be of like-minded individuals, who bolster the new member, and increase the positive feelings associated with their identity.

SIT places the most importance in dynamics of the group because individuals' identity ties to group membership in that it enables individuals to join the group.<sup>496</sup> Once inside the group, individuals make social comparisons between themselves and both members of the group (in-group) and those outside the group (out-group).<sup>497</sup> These comparisons to others determine the

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<sup>490</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>491</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>492</sup> Ibid.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid.

<sup>494</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context*, 94.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>496</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 21.

<sup>497</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 96.



influence of both intergroup and out-group relations on the individuals, in that they necessarily self-identify as members of particular groups as part of both their personal and social identity.<sup>498</sup>

Interview question five relates to how the individual research subjects became involved with their respective organizations. The commonality involved personal relationships. Spence lived with his grandfather, who was a local Klavern leader, and began attending meetings with him at the age of six.<sup>499</sup> Following years away from the movement, Spence renewed his Klan association in the military when his fellow Marines and he held Klavern meetings in their California barracks.<sup>500</sup> Noble, not born into the organization, also became involved through personal relationships.<sup>501</sup> He and his wife visited friends in the commune with plans to have their child in the community.<sup>502</sup> The Nobles, drawn by their love of the people and the location, chose to remain.<sup>503</sup> While these personal relationships did not originally involve the groups the subjects later joined, they are still in-groups. Every individual has multiple associations in separate in-groups with whom to self-identify that can include race, gender, political affiliation, religion, citizenship, or any number of groups or identities people considers themselves. With Spence and Noble, one in-group led them to others, where they joined additional in-groups.

Interview question two related to not only why the subjects associated with their organizations, but also why they chose to join the group. The responses to question two mirrored those of question one in most instances. Spence related very similar information to question one, but focused on his personal associations from the military and friendship with Tom Metzger as the main reasons he

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<sup>498</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 100.

<sup>499</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid.

<sup>501</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>502</sup> Ibid.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid.

renewed his Klan involvement from childhood.<sup>504</sup> Spence also explained the Klan is a family tradition, which makes it normal, perhaps even expected, with that particular in-group.<sup>505</sup> For Noble, the attraction of Christian communal living, including common goals and fellowship, were the main draws for joining.<sup>506</sup> He explained, "You become so self-identified with each other, with the group, that you realize, 'We are a little different than everyone else.' You've taken how you would be with society and transferred that to the collective."<sup>507</sup> Noble felt his new "family" was a utopia.<sup>508</sup> As Spence and Noble added their organizations to their associations, they developed new in-groups to describe a new part of their self-identity. At the time of their associations, the KKK and the CSA gave Spence and Noble positive self-identities.

Interview question three related to why others joined the organizations. The responses from two vastly different organizations were strikingly similar. The two main themes included family and a sense of belonging.<sup>509</sup> Both Spence and Noble explained a draw to the KKK and the CSA include the family oriented environments and the sense of belonging to another "family" of like-minded individuals.<sup>510</sup> This familial situation not only satisfies the internal longing to join a group when individuals may have nothing else in their lives that elicits a positive self-identity, but also, the internal need to belong and contribute to a larger cause.<sup>511</sup> The differences that arose in the responses related to government and community. Spence stated many individuals join the KKK based on their distrust

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<sup>504</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid.

<sup>506</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>507</sup> Ibid.

<sup>508</sup> Ibid.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>510</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>511</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview; Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 95.

of the federal government, and in hopes of avoiding taxes.<sup>512</sup> Spence explains, “To the Klan the enemy is the federal government, period.”<sup>513</sup> Therefore, when an individual is searching for an in-group association based on anti-government views, the Klan is a viable option. Noble’s response explained the lure of community because it draws people together and creates a stronger bond and collective identity to the point members’ feelings toward one another include, “I would die for you.”<sup>514</sup> To an individual searching to fill a void, this feeling is a powerful motivation to participate.

Interview question seven related to recruitment activities. With the exception of Noble’s assertion that religious groups often feel growing the organization is in God’s hands, the responses were similar.<sup>515</sup> Both subjects detail recruiting efforts to include public or active recruiting measures like rallies and local gathering spots, advertisements like flyers and publications, and membership driven recruitment like tapping into personal relationships.<sup>516</sup> Both Spence and Noble agreed that membership recruitment of former friends and family was the best way to grow the groups, should they choose to increase their numbers.<sup>517</sup> This type of recruitment allows the group to grow, while maintaining similar in-group dynamics because members will necessarily target like-minded people with whom they already have close personal relationships.

## **E. “BALANCED-POWER” AND KLAN VIOLENCE**

Research question five related to the feasibility of using “balanced-power” efforts to counter Klan violent extremism. The only common themes that emerged in the responses were the view of the County Sheriff as the only ruling

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<sup>512</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>513</sup> Ibid.

<sup>514</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid.

<sup>516</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>517</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

official and the need for trust and honesty in any process.<sup>518</sup> Spence felt for the KKK, the only way to counter violent extremism was with hard-power tactics using law enforcement investigative methods.<sup>519</sup> The law enforcement agency was still required to approach the individual honestly and play on family values and patriotism to gain trust and cooperation.<sup>520</sup> Noble, on the other hand, advocated only a soft-power approach using whole community efforts.<sup>521</sup> Noble agreed the law enforcement officials must be honest and consider the background of the particular individual they target to know what values to play upon, such as family, religious, or political.<sup>522</sup> Both men agreed the Sheriff is in the best position to have success with any method or communication.<sup>523</sup>

Interview question twelve related to the possibility of a relationship between law enforcement and the group. The only common themes included trust/honesty and family values.<sup>524</sup> Spence felt with the KKK, law enforcement needs prior knowledge of a possible plot and can use that knowledge to approach the targeted individual with the request, "We need your help."<sup>525</sup> Play on the patriotic self-image and the foundational support of women and children to sway the individual, who should be within a leadership position, and developed as a confidential informant.<sup>526</sup> For Noble, he felt engaging groups like the CSA was possible, but potentially harder unless law enforcement can identify someone who is the stabilizing factor within the organization, as he was with Ellison.<sup>527</sup> Consider the person who authors the newsletter and consider any

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<sup>518</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>519</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>520</sup> Ibid.

<sup>521</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>524</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>525</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid.

<sup>527</sup> Noble, interview.

targeted individual's educational, family, religious, and political background.<sup>528</sup> The key is to approach people in an honest, non-threatening manner, showing concern and a willingness to talk.<sup>529</sup> Dispel the view of law enforcement as the "enemy."<sup>530</sup>

Interview question thirteen related to who should be involved in the relationship. Again, the only common theme was the County Sheriff. Given the strong anti-government rhetoric in both the KKK and the CSA, Posse Comitatus is important in their views.<sup>531</sup> This movement requires the only ruling authority, the Sheriff, to play a central role if any relationship stands a chance of success. Everything else related to the topic was different, but in line with each subject's response to interview question twelve. Spence felt the only ones involved would have to be the informant and the one law enforcement official assigned as their handler.<sup>532</sup> Trust is vital in these relationships, and law enforcement cannot engage the informant in front of others, including family.<sup>533</sup> Noble felt every aspect of society should participate to increase exposure to differing ideologies, thus increasing the likelihood of successful counterterrorism efforts.<sup>534</sup> These aspects included the educational system, media, social service agencies, and churches.<sup>535</sup> Noble advocated honest, open dialogue that stressed commonalities in ideals, such as patriotism and family values, to dispel fear of the "other."<sup>536</sup> Noble explained that honest dialogue decreases fear, which is the driving force in the right-wing movement.<sup>537</sup>

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<sup>528</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>532</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>533</sup> Ibid.

<sup>534</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>535</sup> Ibid.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid.

<sup>537</sup> Ibid.

Interview question fourteen related to the subjects' suggested counterterrorism approaches. They had nothing in common and related closely to the subject's individual responses to questions twelve and thirteen. Spence said with the KKK, the only alternative to the confidential informant scenario was the infiltration of the organization with undercover law enforcement resources.<sup>538</sup> This infiltration may allow law enforcement to gain intimate knowledge of small cell operations, but could potentially be dangerous for the officer. He felt no other approach works with the KKK.<sup>539</sup> Noble continued with the whole community approach based on soft-power methods, and expounded on his suggestions.<sup>540</sup> For members of organizations like the CSA, they experience pressure from above via the organizational leaders, and pressure from below through personal obligations like family.<sup>541</sup> As individuals feel more pressure, they see no hope and stand an increased chance of perpetrating extremist violence.<sup>542</sup> By improving the individual's circumstances, increased hope occurs as does less dependence on the in-group rhetoric.<sup>543</sup> Noble stated programs aimed at improving these circumstances stand the greatest chances of success.<sup>544</sup> It is important to consider Noble's suggestions cannot target only one of the individual's circumstances, as seen with gang intervention methods in the United States, but rather require a multi-pronged approach using the whole community to be successful.<sup>545</sup> Noble explains it is necessary to treat the groups as they would not expect to lessen their fears of the "enemy" and dispel stereotypes they may hold.<sup>546</sup> Part of any successful program will redirect the individual's energy

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<sup>538</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>539</sup> Ibid.

<sup>540</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>541</sup> Ibid.

<sup>542</sup> Ibid.

<sup>543</sup> Ibid.

<sup>544</sup> Ibid.

<sup>545</sup> Tobin, *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective*, 150–159.

<sup>546</sup> Noble, interview.

to positive pursuit and involve the group in the community at large.<sup>547</sup> It is vital to understand the particular group's ideology and theology, and not feed the "us" versus "them" mentality.<sup>548</sup>

This chapter provides data related to all five research categories and 14 individual interview questions. In the next chapter, the research draws conclusions from the data, related to the focus of this research. Then, the research provides recommendations for the next step related to the possibility of countering Klan violent extremism.

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<sup>547</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>548</sup> Ibid.

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## IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Brad Deardorff's, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, suggests implementing "Regional Outreach Coordination Centers (ROC Centers)...to coordinate engagement activities and tailor local approaches" in counterterrorism efforts.<sup>549</sup> Sustained engagement between groups normally seen in opposition necessarily engages individuals on a cognitive and an emotional level, as well as encourages evaluation of differing perspectives during discussion. Deardorff explains, "ideologies, therefore, are best countered by creating experiences that conflict with preconceived stereotypes and the opponent's narrative."<sup>550</sup>

The UK's Prevent and Deardorff's "balanced-power," both discussed in Chapter VII, related to different counterterrorism approaches, target religious extremist groups. The Sperger Model, also discussed in Chapter VII, combats gang membership. White supremacist organizations fall under neither category. All the models, however, have the common goal of reducing violent extremism from within the ranks of whatever group they target. The goal of this research was to determine if the application of Deardorff's "balanced-power" and ROC Centers made a successful foundational approach for counterterrorism efforts related to Klan violence.<sup>551</sup>

The possible application of "balanced-power" considered a different "end game" than normally seen by law enforcement. The desired outcome was not to conduct surveillance, pursue criminal investigations, or arrest members of the organization. The goal, instead, was employing a combination of methods to develop a new model aimed at preventing acts of KKK violent extremism. Although previously emphasized, a denial of the presence of white supremacist

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<sup>549</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 223.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>551</sup> Deardorff, "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity," 19; Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*.

organizations within the DFW area exists; however, they are there. Not only the KKK and CSA leaders involved in this research, but large groups of organizations in the rural Southeastern portion of Dallas, self-identify as Aryan groups or white supremacists, whether law enforcement agrees with their self-imposed identities or not.<sup>552</sup> In opposition to the taboo idea of colluding with racists, a potential social benefit is possible if law enforcement is willing to work with any individuals who renounce violence as a way to further extremist beliefs.<sup>553</sup>

Recall the five themes addressed in this research.

- Is it possible to counter violent extremism *from within* KKK?
- Are there generational differences in leadership that effect interactions with the group?
- Does religion influence race relations?
- What induces participation in the group?
- Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to counter violent extremism *from within* the KKK?

#### **A. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

Surprisingly, a common anti-government theme emerged within the two very different groups. Both the KKK and the CSA recognized the County Sheriff as the only law enforcement entity with authority and they both wanted war with the U.S. government.<sup>554</sup> The KKK’s desire to bomb the Mitchell Energy plant was part of an overall plan to finance a war with the government.<sup>555</sup> While the CSA’s plan to bomb the Metropolitan Community Church was not to help finance the war, it was to start the war in response to the death of tax protestor Gordon Kahl.<sup>556</sup> In addition, both subjects expressed a strong sense of patriotism and

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<sup>552</sup> ADL, “The Aryan Brotherhood of Texas”; *The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate*, 11; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment.

<sup>553</sup> Hellyer, *Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, 42.

<sup>554</sup> Spence, interview; Noble, interview.

<sup>555</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>556</sup> Noble, interview.

love of country, which was common with both groups, along with the importance of family values.<sup>557</sup> These last two may seem to contradict the anti-government beliefs, but in fact do not. Both groups see faulty government decision making as detrimental to the country they love. They hold a strong positive identity related to their U.S. citizenship and membership in the American in-group. The same holds true for the groups' beliefs in family values and protection of the family unit. The family is, like their American identity, another in-group people belong to in which they maintain a positive self-identity. Challenge of the family unit elicits a similar response, if not stronger, as a challenge to patriotism.

Aside from these similarities, divergent viewpoints emerged related to KKK and CSA leaders, Bob Spence and Kerry Noble, respectively. The research did not prove the ability to counter KKK violent extremism. The unexpected discovery was the anti-government tie between, what most perceive as a racially motivated hate group, the KKK, and a Christian patriot group, the CSA. It appears that the right-wing movement, rather than motivated by the idea of white supremacy, potentially adheres more to an anti-government agenda, similar to the "Freemen" movement, which, according to Joel Dyer, "applies to anyone claiming to be a sovereign."<sup>558</sup>

## **B. GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES AND INTERACTIONS**

When considering generational differences' effect on interaction with the KKK and the CSA, no similarities emerged. Spence and Noble were in complete disagreement on the topic. Spence felt the KKK was currently more violent, which he attributed to the organization being less family oriented among younger members, as well as the threat of lone wolf extremist violence, which is potentially more likely to involve younger members.<sup>559</sup> Spence said, "Lone

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<sup>557</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>558</sup> Dyer, *Harvest Of Rage: Why Oklahoma City Is Only The Beginning*, 193.

<sup>559</sup> Spence, interview.

wolves are really the problem because there is no oversight for their actions.”<sup>560</sup> Noble, however, felt older members were less likely to be supportive of outsiders than younger members.<sup>561</sup> He saw the in-group/out-group dynamic as stronger with the older members, who have a pronounced “us versus them” mentality.<sup>562</sup> Leaders within the organization may hold sway with the group as a whole, but the head of the organization “has too much invested to be willing to think outside his box.”<sup>563</sup>

The research did not prove common generational differences in leadership affect interactions with the group. As each group is individual, so too is the leadership. When developing successful counterterrorism policy, if choosing a potential engagement with group leadership, it is necessary to have an understanding of the specific leader in question. Assumptions based on common generational principles are likely to be unsuccessful.

### **C. RELIGION AND RACE RELATIONS**

Spence and Noble did not agree on the influence of religion on race relations. For the KKK, attitudes regarding race revolved around government involvement and the political aspects of race relations, especially related to hate crime accusations.<sup>564</sup> A strong underlying fear of potential future incidents labeled as hate crimes arose based on the group openly expressing racial beliefs.<sup>565</sup> For the CSA, views on race relations relied strictly on theology and specific biblical scriptures. Christian Identity is a white supremacist religion, which adheres to the belief that Anglo Saxons are the true Israel.<sup>566</sup> The CSA

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<sup>560</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>561</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid.

<sup>563</sup> Ibid.

<sup>564</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>565</sup> Ibid.

<sup>566</sup> Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 85–86, 88–89; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity, 124–125.

embraced the seed-line doctrine of the Christian Identity religion and believed the true Israel descends from the union between Adam and Eve, while the Jews descend from the union of Eve and the Devil.<sup>567</sup>

Despite the KKK's history of anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and acting as protector of white Protestant America, no association emerged with the religiously motivated CSA.<sup>568</sup> The research did not prove religion influences race relations, or even perceptions. Assumptions based on the perceived religious leanings on any organization with regard to counterterrorism efforts are potentially false. Although a group, like the KKK, has a documented history of religious motivations, the counterterrorist must consider all underlying ideology in the organization. Like the KKK, motivations may relate more to other factors, such as the political concerns of society at the time. Even when considering religious groups like the CSA, it is vital to understand the nuances of their particular ideology prior to engagement. Further, even groups like the KKK, that have similar basic ideologies, sometimes develop different focuses within individual Klaverns. For example, Spence's True Knights of the KKK focused on the belief of the federal government as the enemy, while Thom Robb's White Patriots of the KKK focused on combining Christian Identity theology with traditional Klan beliefs.<sup>569</sup>

#### **D. GROUP PARTICIPATION**

Several commonalities emerged related to the inducement to participate in the KKK and the CSA. The differences that emerged related mainly to the motivation of the individual research subjects. Common themes with group involvement in the KKK and the CSA included family, belonging, personal relationships, and recruitment. . For Spence, his participation in the Klan began

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<sup>567</sup> Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity," 45; Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, 88.

<sup>568</sup> Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 33, 112–113; Spence, interview.

<sup>569</sup> Spence, interview; Brannan, "Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity," 125–126.

with family ties and continued with personal relationships he developed.<sup>570</sup> Others join the KKK for the family orientation and sense of belonging not only to a group, but to a family as well.<sup>571</sup> In addition, the most successful recruiting methods involve calling on those personal relationships, include the individual member's friends.<sup>572</sup> For Noble, his participation in the CSA began with personal relationship with friends and the camaraderie of the communal living arrangements.<sup>573</sup> Others joined the CSA for the "family" gained by participation, in addition to an internal longing to belong to a group and something seen as a larger cause.<sup>574</sup> As with the KKK, the most successful recruiting methods involved calling on personal relationships with former friends and biological family.<sup>575</sup> The similar recruiting methods allow the groups to grow, while maintaining similar in-group dynamics because members will necessarily target like-minded people with whom they already have close personal relationships.

SIT places the most importance on dynamics of the group because the individual identity ties to group membership in that it enables the individual to join the group.<sup>576</sup> Once inside the group, individuals make social comparisons between themselves and both members of the group (in-group) and those outside the group (out-group).<sup>577</sup> These comparisons to others determine the influence of both intergroup and out-group relations on the individual. Individuals necessarily self-identify as members of particular groups as part of both their personal and social identity.<sup>578</sup>

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<sup>570</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>571</sup> Ibid.

<sup>572</sup> Ibid.

<sup>573</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>574</sup> Ibid.

<sup>575</sup> Ibid.

<sup>576</sup> Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 21.

<sup>577</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context*, 96.

<sup>578</sup> Ibid., 100.

This research did show a similar motivation to participate in different types of right-wing groups, as understood through the lens of SIT. Although SIT has emerged in academia as the most valuable theoretical framework for counterterrorism efforts, its more common application today is to Islamic fundamentalist organizations. According to Brannan, issues arise when addressing right-wing terrorism because few of the individuals who commit acts of domestic terrorism, despite their similar ideology and ties to the movement, had the open support of a terrorist organization.<sup>579</sup> SIT is potentially the building block for counterterrorism efforts related to the white power movement. According to Kerry Noble, the things that lead an individual to become involved with white supremacy are the same things that lead another individual to become involved with Islamic fundamentalism.<sup>580</sup>

#### **E. “BALANCED-POWER” AND KLAN VIOLENCE**

The only common themes that emerged in the response to the potential success of “balanced-power” were the view of the County Sheriff as the only ruling official and the need for trust and honesty in any process.<sup>581</sup> Spence felt, for the KKK, the only way to counter violent extremism was with hard-power tactics using law enforcement investigative methods.<sup>582</sup> Noble, on the other hand, advocated only a soft-power approach using whole community efforts.<sup>583</sup> Noble agreed the law enforcement officials must be honest and consider the background of the particular individual they target to know what values to play upon, such as family, religious, or political ideals.<sup>584</sup> Both men agreed the Sheriff is in the best position to have success with any method or communication.<sup>585</sup>

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<sup>579</sup> Brannan, “Left- and Right-wing Political Terrorism,” 55.

<sup>580</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>581</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

<sup>582</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>583</sup> Noble, interview.

<sup>584</sup> Ibid.

<sup>585</sup> Ibid.; Spence, interview.

This research could not conclusively prove the feasibility of applying “balanced-power” to KKK violent extremism. Noble advocates using approaches very similar to Deardorff’s ROC Centers.<sup>586</sup> However, while incentive to move forward with recommendations based on data from Noble’s CSA case study alone exists, it is not appropriate. The researcher must consider the data from Spence’s KKK case study. Although Spence’s data completely disproves the “balanced-power” approach to KKK counterterrorism efforts, Spence admittedly continues to hold similar beliefs to his Klan “brothers and sisters.”<sup>587</sup> Further, although Spence claims no active involvement in the KKK “right now,” the researcher gets the impression Spence still lives in that world, with his finger on the pulse of the far right.<sup>588</sup> If that is the case, it makes Spence’s contributions all the more vital related to this research. Perhaps most important is the need for the counterterrorist, law enforcement, and researchers, in general, to closely consider the specific group in question to understand the most appropriate way forward.

## **F. LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH**

This research, like all research, has limitations. A major limitation is the small number of case studies for comparison. Primary source research requires accessibility to individuals willing to cooperate with the researcher. Given the anti-government leanings of the right-wing movement, this is a problem, as the researcher is a member of local government. The implication is reliable primary sources active within the movement are less likely to sit down willingly with law enforcement, no matter the reason. The researcher must rely largely on “formers” for data collection.<sup>589</sup> Although no less reliable, as they are former members involved with domestic terror plots, the pool of potential sources is much smaller.

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<sup>586</sup> Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 223; Noble, interview.

<sup>587</sup> Spence, interview.

<sup>588</sup> Ibid.

<sup>589</sup> Noble, interview.



## **G. RECOMMENDATIONS**

First, further research into the potential of applying “balanced-power” to the right-wing movement is necessary. With a larger, more diverse pool of case studies, a definitive answer may be possible. It could be the idea itself is not feasible for application to the right wing. It could also be that Spence is potentially an outlier, but further research with a larger pool of sources is necessary for a definitive explanation.

Second, related to research topic one, the possibility of countering KKK violent extremism in general, further research is also necessary. Several common themes emerged in the data that need exploration. The main commonality is the anti-government thread running through both the KKK and the CSA, although the research determined the KKK had political leanings and the CSA had differing religious leanings. Based on their similar anti-government views, however, both groups desired war with the U.S. government.<sup>590</sup> The research determined that, unlike the common perception of racial hatred as motivation for right-wing violence, the potential motive might instead be anti-government ideology. While the research did not prove the possibility of countering KKK violence, it does reveal the necessity of further research, but perhaps in a different direction. According to Chip Berlet’s research on militia involvement, radical change in conversation and addressing legitimate grievances is a step toward establishing a relationship.<sup>591</sup> This method of “disarming” the movement previously proved successful with the Posse Comitatus, so perhaps it may again.<sup>592</sup> It is then necessary to explore the possibility of counterterrorism efforts related to the anti-government factions of the right wing, and explore if this common thread runs through the right-wing movement as a whole.

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<sup>590</sup> Noble, interview; Spence, interview.

<sup>591</sup> Berlet and Lyons, “Militia Nation,” 25.

<sup>592</sup> Ibid.

Third, it is necessary to explore the application of SIT in the context of practitioner application. As discussed, large contingents of individuals that self-identify as Aryan reside in the DFW area. The researcher recommends training for law enforcement officers on the defining ideology, inter-group, in-group, and out-group relations within the white supremacist movement. The researcher further recommends education for both law enforcement, and the community at large, on the existing threat of extremist violence posed from within the white supremacist organizations. It is time society looks beyond ideologies potentially considered offensive to the individual people involved, in an effort to protect potential victims from right-wing extremist violence.

David Brannan and Anders Strindberg are on the way to educating practitioners in their forthcoming work, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*. The two provide a workbook for analyzing terrorist organizations, regardless of individual ideologies. Brannan and Strindberg use SIT to analyze groups, ideologies, and actions related to the contextual environment, which is necessary for determining the relevance of group actions or beliefs.<sup>593</sup> While some may believe the study of psychology is more practical for analysis, Brannan and Strindberg aptly explain that psychological approaches fit more appropriately with study of the individual, as opposed to the group.<sup>594</sup> As previously discussed, the applications of SIT assists in understanding the necessity of a positive association of membership with the in-group.<sup>595</sup> The importance of Brannan and Strindberg's work is they provide an analytical framework useful in analyzing individual groups that uses analytical markers to assist with the analysis, which is applicable to the street level practitioner.<sup>596</sup>

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<sup>593</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 16.

<sup>594</sup> *The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement* (New York, NY: Anti-Defamation League, August 9, 2010).

<sup>595</sup> Brannan and Strindberg, *Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners*, 26–27.

<sup>596</sup> *Ibid.*, 37–40.

## H. CONCLUSION

While the research had limitations and did not prove four of the research questions, it remains valid nonetheless. The research did identify the common bond of anti-government rhetoric in vastly different right-wing organizations, specifically the KKK and the CSA. It raised awareness of the need to build upon Joel Dyer's previous research on the "Freemen" movement, which, "applies to anyone claiming to be a sovereign."<sup>597</sup> Following the Oklahoma City bombing, awareness of this growing movement increased, but the more time that lapses, the less important it becomes. Watchdog organizations, such as the ADL, continue their focus on these groups, as evidenced in their publication, *The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement*.<sup>598</sup> Researchers need to continue pursuit of primary source research in this arena, again building on Dyer's previous work.

Further, the application of SIT at a practitioner level is necessary. Although potentially useful in right-wing counterterrorism efforts, with continued research, the theory is invaluable at the practitioner level. Law enforcement officers encounter individuals every day where SIT would assist their understanding. It is necessary to know and understand any group's ideology and theology prior to interactions. This baseline understanding can help even the street level officers in their performance of routine duties.

This research did further support the validity of SIT in relation to terrorism studies. Through primary sources, the research was able to illustrate the importance of group interactions and group dynamics in right-wing organizations, even those committed to acts of domestic terrorism and war against the U.S. government. While not new information, the application to U.S. right-wing groups related to events in 1985, 1997, present-day associations with "formers," and what the researcher believes to be those still on the fringes of the movement,

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<sup>597</sup> Dyer, *Harvest of Rage*, 193.

<sup>598</sup> *The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement*.

further strengthens the use of SIT. It successfully describes past, present, right-wing, and Islamist organizations with equal results, which are that individuals, in search of this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to join a group that will fulfill their emotional needs.<sup>599</sup> The counterterrorist must be there to meet them, beyond hate.

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<sup>599</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 95.

## APPENDIX.

Interview Question 1 - How did you get involved with the organization?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grandfather led Klavern</li> <li>• Age 6, joined grandfather at meetings</li> <li>• Tom Metzger</li> <li>• Military association</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vacation</li> <li>• Visitation</li> <li>• Childbirth</li> <li>• Love of people and place</li> <li>• Drawn to community</li> </ul>

Interview Question 2 - Why did you join?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military associations</li> <li>• Marine barracks</li> <li>• Tom Metzger</li> <li>• Family tradition</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communal living</li> <li>• Fellowship</li> <li>• Growing together</li> <li>• Common goals</li> <li>• Camaraderie</li> <li>• Group identification</li> <li>• "We are different"</li> <li>• Utopia</li> <li>• Family</li> </ul>

Interview Question 3 - Why do others join?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avoid paying taxes</li> <li>• Distrust federal government</li> <li>• Desire for sense of belonging</li> <li>• Family oriented</li> <li>• Sense of belonging to a family</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have nothing else</li> <li>• Internal longing to join others</li> <li>• People want to belong to something bigger than them</li> <li>• Community pulls people together</li> <li>• Like a family</li> </ul>
Interview Question 4 - What do you see as the relationship between different races?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government manipulation of minorities</li> <li>• Minorities have little power</li> <li>• Should not hate based on skin color</li> <li>• Violence based on skin color is wrong</li> <li>• Does not condone race mixing</li> <li>• Fear of hate crime accusations</li> <li>• Like people as individuals</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• White race only race descended from Adam and Eve</li> <li>• Minorities are pre-Adamic</li> <li>• Theologically acceptable</li> <li>• Easier to stereotype those with no prior association</li> <li>• No longer believes</li> <li>• People are people</li> </ul>

Interview Question 5 - Do you participate in organized religion?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Southern Baptist</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Too confining</li> <li>• No encouragement for independent thought</li> <li>• One person's understanding fed to others</li> <li>• Nothing replaces community</li> <li>• Currently involved with branch of Unity Church</li> </ul>

Interview Question 6 - What are your thoughts on Christian Identity?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They are crazy</li> <li>• Believe their religion is only one</li> <li>• Violent</li> <li>• CSA – “nuts”</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “It’s a joke.”</li> <li>• Deceptive</li> <li>• Scriptural explanations decrease struggle</li> <li>• Believed based on leader’s teachings</li> <li>• Excuse for actions rather than true believers</li> </ul>

Interview Question 7 - How do you recruit new members?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public rallies</li> <li>• Literature and flyers</li> <li>• Internet</li> <li>• Word of mouth</li> <li>• Members recruiting friends is best</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depends on group</li> <li>• Advertisement</li> <li>• Active recruitment</li> <li>• Former friends</li> <li>• Family</li> <li>• Target areas drawing possible members</li> <li>• Religious groups place in God's hands</li> </ul>
Interview Question 8 - Is there a difference in leadership with different generations?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Older members advocate doing the "right" thing</li> <li>• Priorities change with times (Catholics, Jews, blacks, federal government)</li> <li>• No longer as family oriented</li> <li>• More violence now</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Old guard less supportive of outsiders</li> <li>• Older leaders have more invested, and more to lose</li> <li>• Older leaders interested in power and prestige</li> <li>• Younger members not yet in positions of authority</li> <li>• Younger members' self-interest not as ingrained yet</li> <li>• Leaders under the head of the organization can still hold sway with other members</li> </ul>



Interview Question 9 - What are your feelings toward law enforcement?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personally supports law enforcement, always has</li> <li>• Public support of law enforcement during time as leader, police defend the family</li> <li>• White supremacists as a whole only recognize the authority of the Sheriff</li> <li>• Sheriff's authority from the people, only elected law enforcement</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under Posse Comitatus, Sheriff is only ruling official</li> <li>• Never targeted Sheriff or deputies based on their relationship</li> </ul>
Interview Question 10 - Would you ever trust them?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust those known personally</li> <li>• Aside from personal acquaintances, no trust</li> <li>• Allowed to join membership roles</li> <li>• Not trusted with all Klavern information</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust developed over the years with Sheriff and deputies</li> <li>• They visited and engaged in dialogue and open communication with group</li> <li>• Later, initial approach of federal agents to express concerns, nothing more, increased trust</li> </ul>

Interview Question 11 - Does your organization condone violence?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organization, no</li> <li>• Individual members, yes</li> <li>• Louis Beam stressed Leaderless Resistance, which is still embraced</li> <li>• Cells within Klaverns are the concern</li> <li>• Leaders fear RICO and choose to remain ignorant of plots and planned violence</li> <li>• RICO is the main reason leadership does not openly endorse violence</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early on a pacifistic group</li> <li>• Guns came later only as self-defense</li> <li>• Consider themselves patriotic, love America</li> <li>• Apocalyptic group expected to defend Christian Patriots during end of days</li> <li>• After Kahl, CSA's duty to take an offensive posture</li> <li>• Violence necessary and accepted afterwards</li> <li>• Kahl was battle cry for right wing to go to war with the U.S. Government</li> <li>• CSA wanted to start the war</li> <li>• Religious groups believe God directs the movements</li> </ul>
Interview Question 12 - Could a relationship be developed between your organization and law enforcement?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only through honesty</li> <li>• Develop with leadership</li> <li>• Must be in a confidential informant type relationship</li> <li>• Need prior knowledge of possible plans to approach and develop an informant</li> <li>• Play on support of women and children as foundation</li> <li>• "We need your help."</li> <li>• Play to family values and patriotism</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Possible, but harder without a stabilizing factor involved</li> <li>• Consider author of newsletter</li> <li>• Other factors include higher educational levels, family, religious, and political background</li> <li>• Approach first and show concern and willingness to talk</li> <li>• Dispel belief of law enforcement as the enemy</li> <li>• Must be non-threatening, which builds bridge and thwarts stereotype</li> <li>• Trust is key</li> </ul>

Interview Question 13 - Who would need to be involved?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only the informant</li> <li>• Law enforcement should be alone and unarmed</li> <li>• Never approach in front of informant's family</li> <li>• Any gender acceptable, but key is protecting informant</li> <li>• Trust is necessary</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Every aspect of society possible</li> <li>• Honest media that will portray both sides</li> <li>• Churches</li> <li>• Educational system</li> <li>• Leverage internet and news media</li> <li>• Economic improvement agencies</li> <li>• Groups like AVE (Against Violent Extremism), composed of "formers"</li> <li>• County Sheriff</li> <li>• Provide outlets and alternative</li> <li>• Anyone to increase exposure to differing ideologies</li> <li>• Honest dialogue decreases fear, which drives the right wing movement</li> <li>• Appeal to patriotism</li> <li>• Stress commonalities</li> <li>• Group members with families are most likely to be engaged, play to this</li> </ul>
Interview Question 14 - What approach would you suggest?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confidential informant from within the organization</li> <li>• Law enforcement infiltration of organization</li> <li>• No other approaches will work</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improvement of individual members' circumstances relieves pressure</li> <li>• Honestly get feedback from area groups and churches what changes they want</li> <li>• Make the changes the local community wants, not government choices</li> <li>• Improving circumstances improves self-image, gives hope for the future</li> <li>• Engage the groups positively, it disarms them</li> <li>• Do not speak out against groups, it feeds their rhetoric</li> <li>• Do the unexpected</li> <li>• Lessen feelings of threat for groups through exposure</li> <li>• Lesson fears of the enemy</li> <li>• Encourage "formers" to participate</li> <li>• Redirect their internal motivations to positive outlets</li> <li>• Involve the group in the community</li> <li>• Understand the ideology and theology of the group</li> <li>• Do not feed "us" versus "them" mentality</li> </ul>

Research Question 1 - Is it possible to counter violent extremism from within the KKK?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• White supremacists as a whole only recognize the authority of the Sheriff</li> <li>• Sheriff's authority from the people, only elected law enforcement</li> <li>• Trust only those law enforcement known personally</li> <li>• Play to family values and patriotism</li> <li>• Wise County was meant to finance war against the U.S. Government</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under Posse Comitatus, Sheriff is only ruling official</li> <li>• Never targeted Sheriff or deputies based on their relationship</li> <li>• Trust developed over the years with Sheriff and deputies</li> <li>• Consider themselves patriotic, love America</li> <li>• Kahl was battle cry for right wing to go to war with the U.S. Government</li> <li>• Group members with families are most likely to be engaged, play to this</li> </ul>

Research Question 2 - Are there generational differences in leadership that effect interactions with the group?	
Spence	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p>No common themes emerged. Although there are differences, the research subjects disagreed on them.</p> </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Older members advocate doing the "right" thing</li> <li>• Older members have underlying fears of RICO and hate crime statutes</li> <li>• Younger members more apt to advocate small cell participation</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Older leaders have more invested, and more to lose</li> <li>• Older leaders interested in power and prestige</li> <li>• Younger members not yet in positions of authority</li> <li>• Younger members' self-interest not as ingrained yet</li> </ul>

Research Question 3 - Does religion influence race relations?	
Spence	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p>No common theme emerged. Influence based on the group's particular motivation, one of which was political and the other religious.</p> </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence based on skin color is wrong</li> <li>• Government manipulation of minorities</li> <li>• Minorities have little power</li> <li>• Identity is violent</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Easier to stereotype those with no prior association</li> <li>• Theologically acceptable</li> <li>• White race only race from Adam and Eve</li> <li>• Minorities pre-Adamic</li> <li>• Identity beliefs as an excuse for action rather than true belief</li> </ul>

  

Research Question 4 - What induces participation in the group?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age 6, joined grandfather at meetings</li> <li>• Military associations</li> <li>• Marine barracks</li> <li>• Family tradition</li> <li>• Desire for sense of belonging</li> <li>• Family oriented</li> <li>• Sense of belonging to a family</li> <li>• Members recruiting friends is best</li> <li>• Public rallies</li> <li>• Literature and flyers</li> <li>• Word of mouth</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Visitation with friends</li> <li>• Fellowship</li> <li>• Camaraderie</li> <li>• "Family"</li> <li>• Internal longing to join others</li> <li>• People want to belong to something bigger than them</li> <li>• Biological family</li> <li>• Former friends</li> <li>• Advertisement</li> <li>• Active recruitment</li> <li>• Target areas drawing possible members</li> </ul>

Research Question 5 - Is "balanced-power" an effective foundation for a program to counter violent extremism from within the KKK?	
Spence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only through honesty</li> <li>• Play to family values and patriotism</li> <li>• White supremacists as a whole only recognize the authority of the Sheriff</li> <li>• Advocates a hard power, law enforcement investigative approach</li> </ul>
Noble	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust is key</li> <li>• Other factors include higher educational levels, family, religious, and political background</li> <li>• Under Posse Comitatus, Sheriff is only ruling official</li> <li>• Advocates a soft power, whole community engagement approach</li> </ul>

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